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Abstract 
Retailers face many challenges: time-to-market reductions are necessary due to 
shorter and shorter product life cycles, greater product variety causing more 
fluctuation in demand calls for high responsiveness in supply chains, and the 
ever increasing need for shorter lead times continues. However, as a result of 
the power that comes with control over consumer contacts, retailers today have 
the opportunity to organize the work in their supply chains in suitable ways. 
 
This thesis focus on how retailers organize their supply chains in light of how 
they choose to compete in consumer markets, and asks the question: how are 
supply chains affected by retail value propositions? Three case studies have 
been conducted in order to answer this question. Two of the case companies 
were considered to utilize cost-based competition, and it was investigated how 
they had organized activities in order to deliver their specific value 
propositions. Equivalent research of a third case company utilizing time-based 
competition was conducted. The study’s findings are in line with theories in 
this field, i.e. that the nature of products’ demand pattern is crucial for that 
which should be focused on, and that physical efficiency is important in cost-
based competition and market responsiveness in time-based competition. 
 
 
Keywords: Supply chain management, retail, strategy  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Our time is extraordinary - competition has never been fiercer and changes 
never more revolutionary! The message is always the same, but nevertheless 
hard to argue against. Globalization, deregulations of markets, and IT-
developments are major changes that clearly affect our societies, and the 
environment wherein companies operate. 
 
In his high-ranking work “The Rise of the Network Society” sociologist Manuel 
Castells (2000) depicts what he consider the crisis of the traditional corporate 
model of organization, based on vertical integration, hierarchy, and functional 
management. During the last century, when demand became unpredictable in 
both quantity and quality, when international markets became too diversified 
and thereby difficult to forecast, and when the pace of technological change 
made single-purpose production equipment obsolete, the mass-production 
system became too costly and too rigid. Emerging technologies now allow for 
the transformation of assembly lines characteristic of the large corporation into 
easy-to-program production units with product flexibility sensitive to market 
variations, and process flexibility sensitive to changes in technology. 
 
Organizations have adapted to the new environment and the main shift is char-
acterized as the shift from vertical bureaucracies to horizontal corporations.  
Seven major trends characterize such corporations: 
 
“organizing around process, not tasks; a flat hierarchy; team management; measuring 
performance by customer satisfaction; rewards based on team performance; maxi-
mization of contacts with suppliers and customers; information, training, and retraining 
of employees at all levels” (Castells, 2000, p.176). 
 
Contemporary business life is process driven and chain oriented; thereby 
integration has become a core-question for companies. The problems with the 
traditional vertical cooperation between organizations are extensive, instead of 
cooperating, actors dependent on each other have been seeking to achieve cost 
reductions or profit improvements at the expense of someone else in the supply 
chain. Companies engaging in transferring costs upstream or downstream 
arguably do not realize that such strategies will not make them more 
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competitive as all costs will ultimately make their way to the market in form of 
increased end consumer prices. Corporations which over the years typically 
have focused on physical efficiency in order to obtain cost cutting have now 
started to experience diminishing returns within their own company. It is 
therefore believed that increased coordination across company borders alleges 
the greatest opportunities for the future. (Fisher, 1997) 
 
1.2 Problem area and research purpose 
Due to the power that comes with control over consumer contacts, retailers are 
often dominant in a supply chain. Closeness to end consumer markets gives 
retailers fast and precise information about matters such as shifting fashion 
preferences and attractiveness of competitor’s offerings, comparable to 
continuous market research. Even though power is no end in itself, it does 
include the opportunity to organize the supply chain in a suitable way. Many 
challenges face retailers today. Expanding product variety, greater fluctuations 
in demand, and shorter and shorter product life cycles make time-to-market 
reductions essential. The ever-increasing need for reduced lead times continues. 
Maximum coordination of work in and between companies is therefore neces-
sary, as otherwise it will lead to higher costs as well as to longer lead times. 
 
There is however no single best way to manage a supply chain; the way 
retailers compete in consumer markets influence what should be focused on. As 
no company can be everything for everyone, there is interdependence between 
what a company sets out to be for a consumer, i.e. the company’s value 
proposition, and that company’s supply chain. According to Christopher 
(1997), a value proposition concerns how, where, and when a company creates 
value for its customers, and that all activities - from product development to 
order fulfillment - should be based upon it. This thesis’ research purpose is to 
investigate the relationship between retailers’ value propositions and their 
supply chains. 
 
A prerequisite for sustainability is that there is a match between what is offered 
to consumers and the organization of the supply chain activities. It is not 
enough to be knowledgeable about competitors and customers’ preferences to 
perform well. Supplying consumer goods in a disorganized or inefficient 
manner will wipe away the chances of making profits. This was evident in the 
dot com death where so called e-retailers lacking logistical expertise were 
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driven out of business; left are more or less traditional and experienced store- 
based retailers and mail order companies who have added just another sales 
channel - the web. Profound understanding about how factors such as type of 
product, fashion content, demand pattern, assortment width, service level, and 
location is related to supply chain work, are therefore crucial. 
 
1.3 Research questions 
The overall research question is as follows: how are supply chains affected 
by retail value propositions? There are two sides on this question; one that 
has got to do with what retailer are vis-à-vis its customers, and one that has got 
do with how retailers organize their supply chains. The connections between 
these two parts are central in this study. 
 
A good framework to use for this purpose is Porter’s (2003) “Tests of a 
strategy”; on that base, we set out to analyze how different retailers’ supply 
chains are tailored to deliver their specific value propositions. The following 
sub questions will be used for this purpose: 
 
• What is the company’s value proposition? 
- What kinds of needs are being satisfied? 
- Who are the customers? 
- What product assortment is offered? 
- What does the company-customer interface look like? 
- What is the relative price level? 
 
• How is the supply chain tailored to deliver the value proposition? 
- What is the configuration of activities? 
- How do activities fit together? 
- What tradeoffs are made? 
  
The research questions provide the structure of the research, but they will not 
be explicitly answered. Important to keep in mind is that with this framework, 
comparisons of companies in different industries are not really meaningful, 
since the fundamental unit of analysis is the industry itself. The industry 
structure lays out the overall rules of competition and the relative position 
within the industry is the source of competitive advantage (Porter, 2003). 
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1.4 Methodological issues 
Being aware of the latent criticism of management research in general, and case 
studies in particular (e.g. Gill & Johnson, 1997), we are undoubtedly aware of 
the fact that our individual subjectivity does intervene, therefore we consider 
ourselves as a variable in this paper’s research design, which should be kept in 
mind by the reader. However, we have tried to exercise subjective judgments 
and critical reflections in all our observations and analyses, while trying to 
realize our own consciousness, paradigms and selective perceptions at all 
times. 
 
1.4.1 Research perspective 
Contrary to traditional supply chain literature, which often has a manufacturer 
perspective that looks upon supply chains as means of reaching targeted market 
segments, we have had a retail perspective throughout this thesis, investigating 
the interdependence between supply chains and retailers’ value propositions. 
 
1.4.2 Research design 
In this part we will go trough the steps we have taken to get from our research 
questions to our conclusions, via theoretical frame of reference, empirical data, 
and analysis. Setting out to design this thesis research endeavor, we relied upon 
the guidelines for case studies in management research by Patton and 
Appelbaum (2003), describing case studies as empirical inquiries investigating 
contemporary phenomenon within real-life contexts, where perhaps the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not yet clearly defined. 
Following our chosen area of research - supply chain management - and our 
descriptive purpose, we believe the described view to be the most beneficial 
one for the purpose of this study. 
 
Determining the object of study 
This process has been presented in the introductive part, where problem area, 
research purpose, and research questions makes up the object of study. 
 
Selecting the cases 
Following the needs for our study regarding relevancy, our choices of case 
companies are in line with our decision of investigating a small number of 
companies representing different branches of retailers as well as having 
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substantially different value propositions. According to this idea, we chose 
Lindex to cover a supply chain offering fashion clothing. Ica was chosen to 
represent the retail segment offering mainly groceries, which are goods whose 
outline patterns very different from clothing. As an outsider representing both 
branches mentioned, Ge-kås was chosen due to their status as a multi-retailer, 
and for their, to say the least, rather untraditional structure. As our case 
companies are different, and hence not competing with each other in the same 
industry, it is important to mention that we will not compare them with each 
other. What is focused on is the connection between each and every retailer’s 
value proposition and its associated supply chain. 
 
Building initial theory through a literature review 
The theoretical frameworks have been built through a literature review within 
the area of study, consisting of secondary sources from academic articles and 
books. In order to make it easier for the reader, the relevant theories are 
presented as close to the case’s empirical findings as possible. 
 
Collecting and organizing the data gathering 
The case specific empirical data gathering has been performed through semi 
structured expert interviews with key personnel at our case companies. The 
interviews have all been quite long, about two to three hours, and during that 
time we have managed to cover all areas of interest. The people interviewed at 
the different companies have been holding somewhat similar positions, 
enabling us to structure the interviews accordingly. All interviews were 
conducted at the interviewee’s work places. After gathering this information we 
have had the opportunity to, via e-mail and telephone, get questions answered 
and also get additional information. Each case company’s premises have also 
been visited in order for us to observe the activities on site, and so also get a 
deeper understanding of the work that is being performed. The primary data 
that has been collected through the expert interviews has been complemented 
with other relevant secondary information sources, such as annual reports, 
websites, and magazines. 
 
Analyzing the data and reaching conclusions 
The gathered data is then discussed and analyzed throughout each case chapter, 
which means that there are no separate results or analysis parts. The material 
presented in the case chapters is a combination of interview findings and the 
complementary sources of information, as interpreted by us. It will also be 
 6 
 
evident, without over-clarifying headings, when it is our own analysis and 
when the text is based upon empirical findings. In the concluding chapter we 
will bring the analysis to a higher level, where we relate the findings of the 
study to the theories used.  
 
1.4.3 Validity and reliability concerns 
Some aspects need to be brought up concerning this study’s validity and 
reliability. We believe that the connection between the theoretical framework 
and the empirical data is strong and that our study measures what it is supposed 
to measure; hence we consider the internal validity to be high. Regarding the 
external validity, we believe that it is difficult to generalize some of our 
findings to other cases, as we consider them to be very case specific dependent 
upon each company’s way of competing. We do however believe that it is 
possible to generalize the findings about connections between type of products 
and supply chain management, but all in all, the external validity is quite low.  
 
Whether another study conducted in the same way would generate the same 
results is difficult to say. Our study has a qualitative approach where our own 
interpretation and analysis of data is a major factor; subjectivity is thus an issue 
here. Another study conducted by other researchers would perhaps reach a 
slightly different result. However, the demands for high reliability is lower in a 
qualitative study than in a quantitative, as a qualitative study focus more on 
exemplifying than generalizing (Svenning, 1996). 
 
1.5 Thesis outline 
 
 
Figure 1: Thesis outline 
Empirical findings and analysis Theoretical framework 
Chapter 1 
Problem area 
Research 
purpose 
Chapter 2 
 
Supply chain 
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Cost-based 
competition 
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Time-based 
competition 
Chapter 4-5 
 Case 1: Ge-kås
 Case 2: Ica 
Chapter 7 
Case 3: Lindex
Chapter 8 
 
Conclusions 
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2 Supply chain management 
 
The phrase supply chain management (SMC) lacks a clear definition. A 
literature review reveals that it has become an expression in business literature 
used to incorporate almost anything within the field of marketing and logistics. 
To give one example: Ross (1997) considers SCM to be no less than a method, 
a concept, a philosophy, a system, a process, a strategy, and a state of mind. 
With such an all-embracing depiction it is hard to grasp what it really is; 
below we will look into what we consider to be the constituent parts of SCM.  
 
2.1 What is a supply chain? 
 “A supply chain is the set of entities that collectively manufactures a product 
and sells it to an endpoint.” (Stern et al, 2001, p.513) The ultimate beginning 
point is where raw materials are being extracted and the end point would be 
where goods and services are being consumed, or perhaps even recycled. 
However, this view is extremely comprehensive (read theoretic) and obviously 
very difficult to put into a practical context. Therefore, the business view on 
supply chains is somewhat arbitrary, leaving managers to decide their own 
boundaries of the supply chain. (Ibid) The alignment of firms is in the literature 
alternating called a supply chain, a demand chain, a value chain, or a marketing 
channel.  
 
2.1.1 What is the work in a supply chain? 
The work in a supply chain includes the performance of what Stern et al (2001) 
label marketing flows. Nine generic flows between channel members are 
identified and illustrated in figure 2 below. Some of the flows move forward 
through the channel (physical, ownership, promotion), some move backwards 
(ordering and payment), whereas other flows move in both directions 
(negotiation, financing, risking, information).  
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Figure 2: Flows in a marketing channel 
(Stern et al, 2001, p.89) 
 
The activities in figure 2 need to be matched to the demands of the targeted 
market segment. Stern et al (2001) refer to early distribution channel researcher 
Louis P. Bucklin’s theory for end-user preference. Even though this framework 
is almost 40 years old, we consider it to be highly relevant for our case studies, 
as it can be used to describe a retail-customer interface in a structured way. 
Bucklin specified four generic service outputs for a marketing channel: bulk-
breaking, spatial convenience, waiting or delivery time, and product variety.  
 
• Bulk-breaking refers to the opportunity for consumers to buy in small 
lot-sizes, allowing them to transform purchases easily into consumption, 
thus reducing the need for consumers to carry unnecessary inventory. 
• Spatial convenience denotes that products are being supplied close to the 
consumer, thereby reducing transportation and search costs. Examples of 
channel forms with spatial convenience are neighborhood supermarkets 
and vending machines. 
• The longer the waiting or delivery time, the more inconvenient it is for 
consumers, who are required to plan consumption in advance.  
• Finally, the greater the product variety available to the consumer, the 
higher is the service output. Greater assortment usually entails carrying 
more inventories, which is reflected in higher distribution costs.  
 
 
 
 
Physical 
 
Ownership 
 
Promotion 
 
Negotiation 
 
Financing 
 
Risking 
 
Ordering 
 
Payment 
 
Information 
 
Physical 
 
Ownership 
 
Promotion 
 
Negotiation 
 
Financing 
 
Risking 
 
Ordering 
 
Payment
 
Physical 
 
Ownership 
 
Promotion 
 
Negotiation 
 
Financing 
 
Risking 
 
Ordering 
 
Payment 
 
 
Manu-
facturer 
 
 
Whole-
saler 
 
 
 
Retailer
 
 
Con-
sumer 
 9 
 
All things being equal, consumers will choose products with higher service 
level. But all things are normally not equal, instead it is a matter of making a 
tradeoff between price and service level. The higher the service output, the 
higher is the value for consumers, but the higher are the costs for channel 
members and, consequently, the higher is the price for consumers. 
 
2.1.2 Putting it together: what is supply chain management? 
The actual term SCM was introduced by consultants in the early 1980s, and 
picked up by academics at the end of that decade (Stock and Lambert, 2001). 
Since then, the confusion around the two terms SCM and logistics has been 
immense; some even seem to use the terms as synonyms, and one can wonder 
what the differences really are. Stern et al (2001) consider logistics, which they 
define as “the management of the flow of physical material” (p.503), to have 
metamorphosed into the concept of SCM which, in turn, has come to include 
every element of the supply chain. Christopher (1998) has a similar 
understanding, also explaining the concept of SCM to be an extension of the 
logic of logistics. The US Council of Logistics Management defines logistics 
management as: 
 
“that part of the supply chain process that plans, implements, and controls the efficient, 
effective forward and reverse flow and storage of goods, services, and related information 
from the point-of-origin to the point of consumption in order to meet customers’ 
requirements” (www.clm1.org). 
 
The roots from logistics are obvious. Still, SCM can be considered more 
extensive than logistics management as it attempts to integrate not only 
logistical activities, such as material, value, and information flows, but all key 
business processes that companies perform across the supply chain. SCM 
integrates supply and demand management within and across companies and 
coordinate processes and activities across functions such as product design, 
manufacturing, marketing, and sales. (www.clm1.org) Advocates definitely 
regard SCM to be more than a new name for logistics. Implementation of SCM 
involves identifying important supply chain members with whom it is critical to 
link, what processes need to be linked to each of these members, and what type 
or level of integration to apply for each process link. Process integration should 
aim at increasing total process efficiency and effectiveness across all members 
of the supply chain, not only across functions within single companies. (Stock 
and Lambert, 2001)  
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2.2 Different supply chains for different products 
2.2.1 Aspects of demand 
Fisher (1997) argues than managers lacking a clear understanding for which 
SCM ideas and technologies are best suited for their company, risk end up in a 
mismatch between their type of product and their supply chain. He suggests 
that the first step to take is to examine the nature of the demand of a company’s 
products. According to Fisher (1997), products fall into two categories when 
based upon their demand patterns: 
• primarily functional products having stable and predictable demand as 
well as long life cycles (e.g. groceries) 
• primarily innovative products supposed to satisfy additional needs, thus 
demand and life cycles becomes unpredictable. (e.g. fashion apparel, 
computers) 
 
Aspects of demand Functional Innovative 
Product life cycle More than 2 years 3 months to 1 year 
Contribution margin (price minus 
variable cost divided by price) 
5% to 20% 20% to 60% 
Product variety 
Low (10-20 variants per 
category) 
High (often millions of 
variants per category) 
Average margin of error in the 
forecast at the time production is 
committed 
10% 40% to 100% 
Average stockout rate 1% to 2% 10% to 40% 
Average forced end-of-season 
markdown as percentage of full 
price 
0% 10% to 25% 
Lead time required for made-to-
order products 
6 months to 1 year 1 day to 2 weeks 
Table 1: Functional versus innovative products: differences in demand 
(Fisher, 1997, p.107) 
 
As noticed in Table 1, innovative products are synonymous with high 
contribution margins and inconsistent demand in comparison with functional 
products, which are stable and have low margins. Therefore, these two 
categories are said to require fundamentally different supply chains. 
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2.2.2 Physical vs. market mediation costs 
Fisher (1997) proposes that a supply chain accomplishes two distinct types of 
functions: a physical function and a market mediation function. The physical 
function includes converting raw materials into products and transportation 
from one point in the supply chain to the next; the costs lie within production, 
transportation and inventory storage. The market mediation function is less 
visible since its purpose is to make sure that the products reaching the market 
place matches consumer demand; cost will appear when supply exceeds 
demand and the price has to be marked down, or the opposite, when demand is 
greater than supply, resulting in lost sales opportunities and dissatisfied 
customers. Table 2 gives an overview of the different approaches. 
 
 Physically efficient process Market responsive process 
Primary purpose 
Supply predictable demand 
efficiently at the lowest possible 
cost 
Respond quickly to unpredictable 
demand in order to minimize 
stockouts, forced markdowns and 
obsolete inventory 
Manufacturing 
purpose 
Maintain high average 
utilization rate 
Deploy excess buffer capacity 
Inventory 
strategy 
Generate high turns and 
minimize inventory throughout 
the chain 
Deploy significant buffer stocks of 
parts or finished goods 
Lead-time focus 
Shorten lead-time as long as it 
doesn’t increase cost 
Invest aggressively in ways to 
reduce lead-time 
Approach to 
choosing 
suppliers 
Select primarily for cost and 
quality 
Select primarily for speed, 
flexibility, and quality 
Product-design 
strategy 
Maximize performance and 
minimize cost 
Use modular design in order to 
postpone product differentiation for 
as long as possible 
Table 2: Physically efficient versus market responsive supply chains  
(Fisher, 1997, p.108) 
 
Since the demand of functional products is assumed to be predictable, market 
mediation is relatively easy and a good match should be achieved. Companies 
producing such products are therefore able to mainly focus on minimizing 
physical costs within the supply chain in order to meet demand at the lowest 
cost, creating a physically efficient process. That approach is not suitable for 
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innovative products since the uncertain market reaction to innovation multiplies 
the risk and possible costs of shortages or excess supplies. As market mediation 
dominates costs for innovative products, they should be given priority. 
Important in such supply chains is information about the marketplace to 
become as responsive as possible. By plotting the nature of the demand for 
each product family and its supply chain priorities in figure 3, possible matches 
and mismatches might be discovered. (Fisher, 1997) 
 
Figure 3: Matching supply chains with products 
(Fisher, 1997, p.109) 
 
As functional products require an efficient process and innovative products 
require a responsive process, companies positioning themselves in the upper 
right-hand or the lower left-hand cells in figure 3 are the ones more likely to 
experience problems. 
 
When put this way, it appears as if there only exists these extremes with 
functional supply chains on the one hand, and responsive supply chains on the 
other. The divisions are probably not that obvious and the boarders not that 
clear. We think that the main point to be made is that supply chains need to be 
thoroughly designed and adjusted to a company’s specific value proposition. If 
the value proposition is based on high fashion content, speed is important 
(responsiveness) and if it is based on low prices, low distribution costs 
(efficiency) are important. Even though the above presented uncertainty 
framework deals more with how supply chains should be devised than how 
they actually are devised, Fisher’s (1997) rather normative writings do seem 
sound. It would be interesting to see how well this theory is rooted in reality. 
Selldin and Olhager (2002) investigated how Swedish manufacturing 
companies managed the design of supply chains with respect to Fisher’s (1997) 
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product characteristics. Although Fisher (1997) focused on consumer goods, 
Selldin and Olhager’s (2002) 128 responses consists of only 31 % consumer 
goods manufacturers while the other respondents were producing towards other 
producers. Hence, in their research, the uncertainty framework is assumed to be 
viable for producer goods as well. Selldin and Olhager tested two things: (1) if 
Fisher’s framework is appropriate for distinguishing between products and 
between supply chains, and (2) if companies with a good product-supply chain 
fit were better performers than those firms having a poor fit between product 
and supply chain. Their results provide support for both the division of 
products into being primarily functional or primarily innovative, and also for 
the division of supply chains into primarily physically efficient or primarily 
market responsive. The results also show that many firms do not follow the 
prescriptive fit between products and supply chains and, more interesting, that 
these “mismatches” do not appear to lead to lower performance. However, 
Selldin and Olhager (2002) conclude that firms with innovative products 
generally benefit from having responsive supply chains, while functional 
products can also benefit from responsive supply chains in some areas. 
 
2.2.3 Demand uncertainties 
A slightly broader angle is put forward by Lee (2002) in which Fisher’s (1997) 
framework is widened to include also supply uncertainties. In a “stable” supply 
process, the underlying technology and the manufacturing process are mature, 
and the supply base relatively well established. The opposite of a stable supply 
process is an “evolving” process where the technology is still under intense 
development; the supply base may therefore be limited both in size and 
experience. Examples of products with stable supply sources are groceries and 
apparel, while hydroelectric power and telecom products are examples of 
evolving supply sources. This widened framework is not really suitable here, as 
our case companies fall into the category having stable supply sources. 
 
2.3 Strategy: delivering the value proposition  
The literature in business strategy is extensive and a review of the different 
schools of thought in this field is not necessary for the purpose of this paper. 
Here we will only briefly justify our choice of strategy literature. One 
distinction can be made between those schools that focus on the strategy 
process, i.e. the manner in which strategies come about, and on those schools 
 14 
 
that focus on the strategy content, i.e. the product of the strategy process (de 
Wit and Meyer, 1998). As the purpose of this thesis is to describe and analyze 
connections between retail value propositions and supply chains, it becomes 
natural that literature on strategy content is most relevant here. One of the most 
influential writers in this field is Michael Porter, and as we find his framework 
sound and credible, we chose that for our study. Still, we are aware of some of 
the critics that has been put forward against Porter, arguing that his writings are 
too top-down focused and prescriptive in nature, focusing more on the content 
and how strategies should be formulated than on how they actually emerge (see 
for example Mintzberg, 2000). 
 
Porter’s (1996) article “What is strategy?” actually starts with what strategy is 
not, as he argues that operational effectiveness is too often mistaken for 
strategy. Operational effectiveness is about achieving excellence in individual 
activities thus moving closer to the productivity frontier, i.e. the state of best 
practice. Focusing too much on this is what Porter calls the exercise of 
mutually destructive competition, as the homogeneity leads to decreasing 
margins for all companies. 
 
According to Porter (2003) there are two main types of competition: optimizing 
and strategic. Accordingly, companies can reach competitive advantage either 
through lowest costs or through differentiation; “companies can run the same 
race faster” or “choose to run a different race” (p.26). The essence of Porter’s 
(1996, 2003) thinking about strategy is that strategy rests on uniqueness, i.e. 
delivering a unique value proposition versus competitors. This is achieved 
either by choosing to perform activities differently than competitors, or by 
performing different activities. 
 
A strategic position is a unique position, one that competitors do not occupy 
and hopefully cannot copy. As no company can be everything for everybody, 
choosing what not to do is as important as choosing what to do. Because of the 
threat of imitation it is vital that companies make tradeoffs, defined as 
“incompatibilities between strategic positions that create the need for choice” 
(Porter, 2003, p.34). Sources of such incompatibilities are:  
• incompatible product and service attributes 
• differences in the best configuration of activities in the value chain 
• inconsistencies in image 
• limits on internal coordination, measurement, motivation, and control 
 15 
 
Furthermore, strategy is also about creating fit among a company’s activities. 
The best fit occurs when mutually reinforcing activities are combined. If cost of 
performing one activity is lowered because of the manner in which other 
activities are performed, then fit exists. This can ensure that companies keep 
their position by making a whole chain of activities hard to imitate. (Ibid) 
 
The following paragraph is an excerpt from an interview with Kevin Rollins, 
Vice Chairman at Dell Computer (Forbes, 1999), that we believe exemplifies 
the interdependences between strategy and all supply chain activities. 
 
Question: “What is it about the directs sales model and mass customization that has 
been difficult for competitors to replicate?” 
Answer: “It's not as simple as just having a direct sales force. It's not as simple as just 
having a mass customization in-plant or manufacturing methodology. It's a whole 
series of things in the value chain: from the way we procure, the way we develop 
product, the way we order and have inventory levels, and manufacturer and service 
support. The entire value chain has to work together to make it efficient and effective.” 
Question: “What is the competition looking at?” 
Answer: “So many of our competitors are really looking at our business and saying 
‘Oh, its the asset management model - seven days of inventory. That's what we're 
going to do’, rather than looking at every one of 10 things and replicate those.” 
 
Support for this way of perceiving strategy is also found in Gary Hamel’s 
(2000) writings as he also highlights the value of uniqueness and fit. A central 
theme in Hamel’s writings is the importance of creating a unique business 
model with internal fit, in the sense of internal consistency, in order to reinforce 
all elements to make profits. 
 
2.3.1 Implications for logistics 
Dvorak and van Paasschen (1996) highlight the importance of tailoring 
logistics to each company’s distinct strategy. They outline three different retail 
strategies: “fast-to-market”, “waves of fresh assortment”, and “low cost”. 
Table 3 contains a product flow comparison with these strategies that is 
declared to be drawn from how successful retailers have configured their 
supply chains. 
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 Fast to market Waves of fresh assortment Low cost 
Manufacturer cost Trade off some cost 
for speed and 
flexibility 
Live with longer lead 
times in order to 
drive lower purchase 
cost 
Drive lowest 
purchase cost and 
off-load as much 
work as possible to 
manufacturers 
Transportation 
from manufacturer 
to distribution 
centre (DC) 
Frequently use 
highest cost 
transportation mode 
(airfreight) to gain 
speed 
Balance speed and 
cost using low cost 
transportation mode 
to small number of 
regional DCs 
Maximize use of 
transportation modes 
by establishing many 
local DCs close to 
stores 
Distribution centre 
cost 
Look for speed Balance speed and 
cost in handling new 
product waves 
Operate DCs to 
minimize work done 
in stores 
Transportation 
from distribution 
centre to store 
Small, fast, and 
expensive store 
deliveries 
More cost effective 
small store deliveries 
Most cost effective 
full truckload 
delivery to stores 
Store operation Full service Full service Self service 
 
Table 3: Product flow comparison  
(Dvorak and van Paasschen, 1996, p.126) 
 
There are many similarities between Dvorak and van Paasschen’s (1996) and 
Fisher’s (1997) writings about supply chain design. Here one can see that it 
also finally comes down to a tradeoff between speed and cost, between high 
fashion content and low consumer prices. The consensus about this appears 
extensive; we have not been able to find any research that disagrees with this. 
 
2.4 Summing up 
What should be focused on in a supply chain is determined by the nature of the 
demand for the products that are being supplied. For functional products the 
basis for competition is physical efficiency; focus should be on building 
“efficient supply chains” with the help of effective logistics systems creating 
economies of scale and high cost efficiencies. In chapter 3-5, including case 1 
and 2, cost-based competition and efficient supply chains will be investigated. 
Chapter 6-7, including case 3, deals with time-based competition and 
innovative products that are best managed with “responsive supply chains”, 
flexible to changing customer demands. 
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3 Cost-based competition 
 
Before going into the study’s two cost-based case studies, this chapter will 
bring in logistics related just-in-time management and the umbrella term for 
supply chain cooperation in the grocery sector efficient consumer response.   
 
3.1 Just-in-time logistics 
One of the most significant concepts in business management in past decades 
has been just-in-time (JIT), originating in Japan, it is a philosophy as much as a 
technique based upon the idea that wherever possible no activity should take 
place until there is a need for it, i.e. no products should be made or ordered 
until there is a requirement for them. According to this requirement, JIT is a 
pull concept where demand pulls goods towards the market. In contrast, 
traditional push systems carry manufactured goods in batches in anticipation of 
demand, and are stored in the supply chain as buffers between various 
functions. In such a conventional approach, reordering takes place when 
inventory falls to a certain predetermined point - the reorder point - which is 
based upon the expected length of the replenishment lead time. At this point, 
the amount to be ordered may be based upon the economic order quantity 
(EOQ) principle, hence balancing the cost of holding inventory against the 
costs of placing replenishment orders. The dilemma with the EOQ model is that 
it is assumed that there is an optimum amount to order (amount to hold in 
inventory), thus arriving at the core problem as the reorder quantity force a 
corporation to carry more inventory than is actually demanded per day over the 
entire order cycle. (Christopher, 1998) 
 
As maximized batch quantities were conventional insights in production before 
the introduction of JIT, similar insights could be found in the rest of the supply 
chain. For example, companies used to ship by container or truck load and 
therefore customers who ordered smaller quantities faced price penalties, as 
well as delivery schedules that were expected to be optimized through 
efficiency of routes. Contradicting this approach, JIT favors small shipments to 
be made more frequently and to meet time requirements of the customer; 
without uneconomic escalations of cost of course, which in itself argues there 
may have to be certain tradeoffs in order to achieve total supply chain cost 
effectiveness. The greater the demand for variety and the higher the value, the 
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more JIT and synchronized delivery becomes preferable. Therefore, according 
to Christopher (1998), the prerequisites for successful JIT logistics would be: 
• A disciplined approach to planning and scheduling of inbound require-
ments. 
• A high degree of communication and planning linkage between supply 
chain partners. 
• More often than not the use of third parties or logistics partners to 
manage the inbound consolidation and sequencing of deliveries. 
• The design of vehicles and physical facilities to make small shipment 
quantities easy to load and unload rapidly. 
• The value and variety of the materials tend to be higher than average.  
 
Summarizing this, the basic requirement for JIT logistics to function properly is 
to make sure that all activities and involved parties of the supply chain are 
synchronized, with each and everyone receiving early information about 
shipping and replenishment requirements. With the emergence of enterprise 
resource planning (ERP) systems, it is possible to have integrated logistics 
systems linking replenishment of products in the marketplace with their own 
and their supplier’s activities through the use of shared information. This way it 
is possible to convert the supply chain from a push to a pull system, enabling 
companies to respond to known demand rather than having to anticipate that 
demand through forecasting. (Christopher, 1998) 
 
3.2 Efficient consumer response 
Efficient consumer response (ECR) has become the umbrella term for supply 
chain cooperation the grocery sector. It began in the US in the beginning of the 
1990’s, focusing on four main areas that had great improvement potential: 
• Continuous replenishment programs, passing point-of-sales data back to 
suppliers. This requires standardization of bar codes and methods and 
implementation of EDI. 
• Efficient pricing and promotion, aiming at reducing self caused demand 
spikes and inventory swings. 
• Changes in product introduction. Combined market research by channel 
members in order to forecast new-product success better. 
• Changes in merchandising for the purpose of finding better ways to 
merchandise brands and categories of products. (Stern et al, 2001) 
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One operational practice that has developed from the JIT and ECR ideas is 
continuous replenishment. The idea is that consumer’s purchases, or 
withdrawals, of goods are the base for that which should be delivered. Point-of-
sales data turns the supply chain into a pull system, as retailer’s stock is 
replenished based on actual sales. By automating the replenishment system the 
goal is also to reduce errors and processing costs. 
 
3.3 Activity map with a cost-based theme 
At the beginning of this paper we set out to investigate how supply chains are 
affected by retail strategies and how the value chain is tailored to deliver a 
company’s value proposition, to see how activities fit together and what 
tradeoffs companies need to make. We believe that a good way to analyze the 
configuration of activities that companies perform is by drawing activity maps. 
Such maps show how a company’s value proposition is contained in a set of 
tailored activities designed to deliver it (Porter, 1996). A good example to 
illustrate a cost-based activity map would be Ikea, since most people have a 
fairly good picture of what Ikea’s value proposition is: “Ikea targets young 
furniture buyers who want style at low cost” (Porter, 1996, p.65). Figure 4 is an 
activity map of Ikea. 
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Figure 4: Activity map of Ikea 
(Porter, 1996, p.71) 
 
Without going too deeply into this single case, one can see that many supply 
chain activities are tailored to deliver Ikea’s value proposition. The higher-
order strategic themes in grey bubbles in figure 4 above are linked together and 
reinforced through all other activities. Necessary tradeoffs to be able to have 
such low prices are, for example, limited sales staffing and a minor possibilities 
to customize products.  
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4 Case 1: Ge-kås 
 
In order to enlighten a non-traditional retail structure we chose the multi 
retailer Ge-kås that within Sweden is a legendary company in the small, 
somewhat remote hamlet of Ullared. What really drew our attention to this 
outsider was their unique formula for sustainable competition, coming from the 
ability of keeping their costs down.  
 
4.1 Introduction 
The story behind Ge-kås as a business success phenomena began in 1963, when 
the entrepreneurial soul of Göran Karlsson rented a basement in Ullared, in 
which he offered small obsolete clothing lots bought from the textile giants in 
Borås. Göran’s strategic business philosophy was to buy cheap and sell cheap, 
letting the amount generate the profit. Through the experiences as a travelling 
salesman, Göran had learned there was a need for low price products, realizing 
that almost anything could be sold if the price is low enough. The first few 
years the business was slowly moving and days could pass without having any 
customers at all. This situation changed and as time went by, additional 
employees were employed according to direct need due to increased demand, 
and the same could be said about the numerous expanding activities. 
Advertisements in local newspapers drew some attention during the first years 
but once customers started to find their way to the simple store with the low 
prices; word of mouth took over increasing customer awareness rapidly. And 
so the business started to really take off. (Andersson, 2003) 
 
According to our interviewees, this way of thinking, buying cheap and selling 
cheap, has remained in the business even after Göran sold the company in 
1991. The new owners immediately started to transform the essence of Ge-kås, 
raising the importance of quality. When asked about this, our interviewees 
stated the phrase “quality goods at the lowest price” in a sense these words 
would represent what Ge-kås today want to be for their customers, and as 
something every process and function within the whole corporate structure 
should be permeated with. The assortment of today differs as well, as three 
main segments can be found: 50% clothing/textile, 25% electronics/tools/toys 
and 25% chemical/food products, compared to the clothing/textile focus Ge-kås 
had in the beginning. 
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Today, the company employs about 430 people full-time (Ge-kås Annual 
Report 2002) and the average number of visitors is about 11,000 per day. 
Figure 5 presents an overview over Ge-kås expansion from the first year until 
2002. 
 
 
Figure 5: Ge-kås’ total sales 1963-2002 (SEK including VAT) 
(<http://www.gekas.se>) 
 
In this context, Ge-kås growth and position is very impressive when compared 
to the ten biggest clothing chains in Sweden, which place the company in sixth 
place based on total sales. This comparison might not be really accurate since 
only about 50% of Ge-kås’ sales come from clothing; still we believe these 
circumstances do contrast Ge-kås’ strength, especially since all sales come 
from one location. (Andersson, 2003) This fact has meant that Ge-kås differ 
significantly from most other retailers in the present Swedish market as they do 
not cooperate with or belong to a national or multinational company or chain.  
 
Here, we present a few financial figures in order to disclose the economic 
performance of Ge-kås, the financial result in 2002 was 68.4 Million SEK, with 
a ROE of 21% and a solidity of 68% (Ge-kås Annual Report, 2002). The sales 
of each employee were 3.7 million SEK excluding VAT (Affärsdata). 
 
4.2 Ge-kås’ value proposition 
By using Porter’s (2003) framework Tests of a Strategy, we will try to reveal 
Ge-kås’ value proposition, and at the same time Bucklin’s theory for end-user 
preference will help us to determine what Ge-kås is to their customers.  
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Ge-kås’ total product assortment is divided into three main segments: 50% 
from clothing/textiles, 25% from home electronics/tools and toys, and the final 
25% consists of chemical/food products. From this point of view, Ge-kås do 
offer a great product variety, thus if relying upon Bucklin, the greater the 
product variety, the greater is the service output presented. Basically, the 
different needs that are being satisfied range from daily life nutritional and 
physical needs (food, clothes and chemical products) and additional needs 
satisfied by home electronics, tools, and toys. Supporting the essence of Ge-kås 
business philosophy “quality goods to the lowest price”, the company’s relative 
price level is extremely low and prices on all products are aimed at being in the 
range between 1/3 and 1/2 below market standards (Andersson, 2003). 
Interesting is the fact that some well recognized food brands that can be found 
at any major grocery chain are also being sold at Ge-kås, at least 1/3 below 
prices offered by national chains. Additionally, we have no reasons to 
disbelieve the quality standards of Ge-kås products, perhaps the level of 
fashion of some of their clothes is not what we ourselves would perceive as 
high end, but the statement regarding the lowest price is definitely true. Relying 
upon Fisher’s (1997) framework regarding different demand patterns, we refer 
to Ge-kås’ clothing assortment as mainly functional, due to lower levels of 
fashion, thus having longer life cycles and more stable demand.  
 
Discussing price levels naturally leads us into Bucklin’s idea regarding bulk 
breaking, which is often the case at Ge-kås. Big packages cost less according to 
basic economic laws, and at Ge-kås most dry food are offered in packages 
bigger than those you might find in stores situated closer to the customer. In 
some instances, when customers travel long distances, big packages are more 
convenient as these customers do not visit Ge-kås more than maybe twice a 
year, which in itself argues for customers wanting to stock basic products for 
longer periods at the lowest price possible.  
 
Discussing the customer interface at Ge-kås, it seems to stand out from 
traditional concepts in several ways. According to Bucklin’s discussion 
regarding spatial convenience, this is distinctly low for Ge-kås as the store is 
situated in a remote location far from most customers. This means that 
customers coming to Ge-kås are aware of the high transportation and search 
cost, still these costs do not exceed the satisfaction customers receive when 
shopping at Ge-kås, even though they might have travelled more than 400 km 
one way. Also, the size of the store is 15.000 m2, equivalent to three soccer 
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fields, and therefore designed with practical reasons in mind; the store is able to 
swallow up to 20.000 people on one day and to replenish all products in a 
convenient way without decreasing existing service levels. 
 
Answering the question regarding who shops at Ge-kås, we know from internal 
customer surveys that the average customer is a 42 year old female coming to 
Ge-kås two to three times a year, travelling an average of 180 kilometres one 
way, spending about 2.600 SEK each time. The total number of customers each 
year is 3.3 million, which also makes Ge-kås Sweden’s most visited tourist 
attraction since many people come each year as a part of their annual holiday 
trip. The female/male percentage rate is 65/35 but according to Ge-kås, the 
male rate is steadily increasing and so is the number of younger people visiting 
the store. According to this information, Ge-kås is targeting any person, no 
matter sex, age or home location, who is willing to pay the high transportation 
and search cost in order to get the possibility to shop quality products, ranging 
from food to home electronics, to the lowest price. 
 
4.3 How Ge-kås deliver its value proposition 
In regards to the discussion above, we assume Ge-kås’ value proposition as 
follows: “Targeting any person who is willing to pay a higher than ordinary 
transportation and search cost in order to buy quality goods to the lowest 
price”. In accordance with this declaration, this part will discuss how Ge-kås’ 
value chain is tailored; the arrangement of activities, and how the activities fit 
together.  
 
Referring to the fact that one single person was managing Ge-kås completely 
on his own until he sold the company in 1991, it was not until the new owner 
group took charge of the business that Ge-kås started to introduce computer- 
based systems. The aim of this introduction was to increase the level of control 
and make functions and processes more efficient, especially since all previous 
administrative operations had been handled manually with pens and papers. 
One could see the computerization as a crucial step towards Ge-kås future 
ability to deliver their value proposition. The computer related investment has 
proven to pay-off quickly and mentioning one example, the introduction of a 
computer-based sales system with scanners has been said to save 140 labour 
hours a day if one second is saved in handling time for each article sold 
(Andersson, 2003, pp.95-96). The benefits from using EDI are many and as this 
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system signalizes when a product is about to be sold out, in store replenishment 
activities are immediately activated at the same time as total inventory is 
controlled. According to one of our interviewees, the company is working hard 
with introducing a registration system that will keep track of each product 
starting with the moment of purchase. This will enable an increased control of a 
products entire life within Ge-kås; from purchasing, shipment from the supplier 
until the arrival at Ge-kås, inventory control, replenishment activities, and the 
actual moment of sales when the products are being bought by customers. Ge-
kås’ need for increased product life-cycle control backwards is probably then 
fully capitalized, as if they were to control even more levels they would have to 
be directly involved in production stages, which we believe is not the strategic 
aim. 
 
4.3.1 Purchasing and distribution activities 
As already mentioned, Ge-kås do not design or produce any products 
themselves. Instead, a division with purchasers is handling all acquisitions of 
products, and one could probably go as far as to say that this process is the 
heart of the company. Ge-kås would probably have a hard time delivering their 
value proposition if the enormous amounts of products could not be obtained at 
extremely low prices, which in turn also argue for Ge-kås need to have a really 
good relationship with their suppliers. According to our interviewees, Ge-kås 
have 600-700 active suppliers and about 100 partly active. The contacts with 
these suppliers are organized through agents, which also mean Ge-kås do not 
have any purchasing offices anywhere in the world, and that there is only one 
stage between Ge-kås and the producers. 
 
The purchasing activities start with agents coming to Ge-kås in order to show 
existing collections and product lines and 75-80% of regular season products 
are bought at such appointments (5-6 months in advance). This means that 
Ge-kås buy about 20% of their total product need during seasons from the “spot 
market”, either through agents or straight from suppliers by themselves. Our 
interviewees stated that most suppliers have a very positive attitude towards 
Ge-kås as a business partner, and one of the main reasons Ge-kås is buying 
products at lower prices would be that they buy immense amounts at each 
purchase opportunity, thereby receiving large discounts. This has also meant 
that Ge-kås have improved their position as a trustworthy customer; buying 
huge obsolete stocks from suppliers that otherwise would experience financial 
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difficulties. Also, the fact that a supplier only has to deliver products to one 
location seems to have increased Ge-kås’ popularity. Providing such benefits 
for suppliers has also led to possibilities of buying obsolete stocks from well-
known high end clothing brands as these producers believe selling to Ge-kås 
will not disturb the “ordinary” market. Reasons for this would be the off side 
location of the store as well as the fact that Ge-kås never advertise their 
products, which mean these clothes will add value unnoticed from traditional 
and ordinary marketing channels. This fact explains the reason one might find 
popular brands with a high level of fashion, which we indeed believe is 
something that adds to the common perception of Ge-kås as a place where one 
can do bargain deals from time to time.  
 
Continuing on the discussion regarding Ge-kås’ non-involvement in production 
processes or pre ordering of any clothing lines, we believe this set up provides 
Ge-kås with a high level of flexibility, affecting purchasing prices positively. 
The specific costs related to the initial part of a product’s life cycle is more 
likely to be overpowered this way, as the costs for market intelligence 
activities, planning, design, forecasting of demand, and production might be 
transferred either upwards or downwards in a supply chain. By just buying, Ge-
kås has power and ability to negotiate purchase prices on products in a way that 
they do not have to “share” the additional costs mentioned. Instead, any 
postproduction costs for obsolete stocks due to forecasting errors might instead 
be beneficial for Ge-kås, as the level of negotiability on such stocks increases.  
 
Regarding logistics and distribution, Ge-kås are in such a strong position, much 
due to their good relationships with suppliers that many times when the 
company buy products; the already paid-for goods are being stored at the 
supplier, thus decreasing Ge-kås own inventory costs. And, as soon Ge-kås is 
in need of these products, the delivery time can be as short as one to two days, 
which according to Ge-kås thereby turn into a powerful lead time strategy as 
they themselves can decide when to have the products delivered.  Another cost 
saving strategy would be that Ge-kås always persuade the supplier to pay the 
costs for shipment and delivery, which according to our interviewees is saving 
the company lots of money each year. Unfortunately, we have no findings from 
suppliers supporting this statement as suppliers might place the price for 
shipping into the total price from the beginning, claiming the initial negotiated 
price was without shipping costs.  
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Ge-kås’ drive for low costs throughout all activities could be linked to Dvorak 
and van Paasschen’s (1996) framework highlighting the importance of tailoring 
logistics to each company’s distinct strategy. Their “low cost” retail strategy  
(See Table 3) do have a product flow similar to how Ge-kås have configured 
their supply chain as the company attempt to pursue the lowest purchase costs 
possible and off-load as much work as possible to manufacturers (all steps in 
production plus in some cases storage of purchased goods). The only 
indifference between Ge-kås supply chain and the “low cost” strategy would be 
that Ge-kås only exist in one location, thus they do not have the proposed 
transportation dilemma from regional distribution centers to stores.  
 
4.3.2 In-store activities 
Regarding assortment variety, pricing strategies and advertisement, Ge-kås has 
a clear strategy of never promoting or advertising any of their products in any 
medium, nor do they use seasonal campaigns or any form of discounts. This 
way Ge-kås do not need to have any guarantees towards the customers and 
their expectations on any products or prices, at any time, which leaves the 
purchasing department with a great deal of flexibility necessary for the 
environment they operate in. This fact enables the purchasers in the company to 
buy whatever product they want, from any supplier, at any price and at any 
time, and backwards; Ge-kås can in the store offer any product, at any price, at 
any time, which also means the traditional “four season” thinking can be 
stretched and remodelled. This is perhaps also the reason customers do not 
mind buying winter gear in the middle of the summer, as long as the expected 
customer satisfaction outweighs the cost. 
 
According to our interviewees this means that Ge-kås is way ahead of 
competitors when it comes to introducing for example winter collections 
already in July, even though we ourselves would argue this has probably 
happened by coincidence and is therefore less likely to be a strategic decision. 
To support our belief, the question is whether people who do not shop at Ge-
kås would buy winter clothing in the middle of the summer just because they 
are being offered earlier than usual? The answer is more likely to be no, thus 
Ge-kås’ ability to sell winter gear in the middle of the summer is probably 
related to the “none-existing” expectations people have when shopping at Ge-
kås. If we assume that a customer coming to the store have a certain 
expectation of buying a jacket, but not a specific model, then the choice of 
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model will not be decided until he or she see the different offerings in the store, 
and once this person finds something close to what was expected, he or she will 
buy this jacket without hesitation related to whether it is the “right” model or 
not. This way a customer will more likely never experience the trade off 
customers obtain in ordinary stores when a certain product is sold out, thus 
adding to overall customer satisfaction. 
 
A flexible purchase and offering system like this means the assortment width 
and variety might fluctuate a great deal, but since Ge-kås do not advertise, 
customers will have no specific expectations, in other words, what you see is 
what you get. Accordingly, Ge-kås pricing strategy also includes a similar way 
of handling obsolete products as no traditional “sale mark downs” are being 
used. Products that do not perform well are instead marked down unnoticed 
until a price level is reached where the product is being sold out, which in itself 
is an argument for why obsolete products are never brought back to the 
inventory stage as the inventory cost of these products will quickly rise, and as 
no product will sell itself while hidden from exposure. These strategies give 
customers a signal completely in line with Ge-kås strategy of never creating 
any specific expectations among customers, thus one should never come to 
Ge-kås at a certain time period as the same price levels are being kept intact 
throughout the year thus adding to an even customer flow. 
 
4.4 Ge-kås’ strategic position 
Summarizing this discussion, we believe Ge-kås’ supply chain is tailored 
accordingly with their value proposition, meaning that their low price focus 
benefit from an efficient supply chain, thus supporting Fisher’s (1997) 
framework. If one considers operational effectiveness as achieving excellence 
in individual activities, strategy is about the combination of all these activities 
(Porter, 1996), thus we will attempt to disclose Ge-kås’ strategic position 
regarding the revealed information in this chapter. 
 
Using Porter’s (1996) ideas of how to analyze the configuration of activities, 
figure 6 is developed in order to visualize our assumption regarding how 
Ge-kås’ value proposition is contained in their company specific set of tailored 
activities designed to deliver it. 
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Figure 6: Activity map of Ge-kås 
 
Referring to Ge-kås’ way of differentiating the company from competitors, our 
interviewees stated that in order for them to be low on price, they need to have 
a superior cost structure, hence we believe the foundation for this declaration is 
shown by the three higher-order strategic themes (grey shaded). According to 
our configuration analysis, all the activities in the figure are reinforced through 
all other activities, thereby enabling Ge-kås to deliver their value proposition. 
However, Ge-kås strategic position would not be sustainable unless they had 
made tradeoffs with other positions. These tradeoffs refer to activities or 
strategic decisions that are interconnected in a manner that if changing them, 
the effect will be opposed to what is expected from the existing supply chain, in 
other words the value proposition will fail to deliver what is expected.  
 
Starting with the higher-order strategic theme of location, Ge-kås would more 
likely experience difficulties if one or more stores were to be established, as all 
the benefits from having all activities in just one remote location would 
diminish. For example, Ge-kås would loose their attractiveness among high-
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disturbing the ordinary market as well as this brand would loose the expected 
level of exclusivity (as such goods today disappear unnoticed “in the woods”). 
Also, probably more important, the cost of having two or more stores would 
increase running costs, thus forcing Ge-kås to increase prices and thereby 
loosing peoples common perception of offering the lowest prices. One can 
imagine how Ge-kås’ mass of cost would increase if buying land and building a 
store similar in size, which is a requirement for the ability to offer the great 
product assortment offered in Ullared. Also, as the situation is today with 
customers coming from all over the country, an additional store would interfere 
on the existing store’s trade area, and thereby generate a number of 
disadvantages. The existing store would get fewer customers and a possible 
response to this would be to offer fewer products as demand would decrease. 
Even though the products could be divided between these two stores, costs for 
distribution would increase dramatically, thus Ge-kås’ would not be able to 
deliver their existing value proposition. 
 
If Ge-kås’ were to begin advertising their products, the fit between activities 
would more likely be disturbed as well. Ge-kås would have to pay a lot of 
money for this service, which would lead to a higher mass of cost as well as the 
beneficial consumer behaviours of today would more likely fall apart. Costs for 
coordination between advertisements and logistics would suddenly appear as 
well as forecasts would have to be practiced in order to match demand. Every 
increase in the mass of cost would lead to an increase in price, and if Ge-kås 
would increase their prices they would no longer attract the huge numbers of 
customers coming today.  The level of customer satisfaction would more likely 
decrease as people would get annoyed if they drove long distances only in 
order to find out that the product they expected to buy was sold out.  
 
If Ge-kås were to design and produce their own clothing, they would have to 
establish new divisions performing all activities related to such operations. 
Purchasing offices would be needed in strategic locations around the world, as 
well as design teams producing all clothing models. Factories that were to 
manufacture the clothing lines would have to be contracted as well as logistics 
companies for transportation. All these activities would increase costs 
enormously, which in turn would mean higher prices on the products offered, 
thus the value proposition would by no means be delivered, thus breaking the 
virtuous circle existing today. 
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5 Case 2: Ica 
 
The second case company is the grocery retailer Ica, operating in a sector that 
according to theories is highly characterized by physical efficiency. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The grocery company Ica Group’s operations are extensive, with subsidiary Ica 
Sverige AB, Ica Menyföretagen AB, Etos AB, and Ica Banken AB in Sweden; 
Ica Norge in Norway; Ica Baltic in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; ISO-ICO 
A/S in Denmark; and the 50:50 owned entities Statoil Detaljhandel 
Skandinavia AS and Netto Marknad AB. Total store sales including taxes for 
the entire group amounted to slightly more than 150 SEK billion in 2002. The 
parent company Ica AB, owned by Dutch Royal Ahold 50%, Swedish Ica 
Förbundet Invest 30%, and Norwegian Canica 20%, houses finance, legal, 
human resource, and IT staff units plus procurement and private label 
coordination functions. Ica is one of Sweden’s most famous brands with brand 
recognition of almost 100%. (Ica Ahold Report, 2002) 
 
We have focused on Ica’s Swedish grocery store concepts operated under Ica 
Sverige AB; these are Maxi Ica Stormarknad, Ica Kvantum, Ica Supermarket, 
Ica Nära, hence excluding foreign operations and operations outside grocery 
retail. One limitation is to be pointed out here. There is one more store concept 
in Sweden carrying the Ica brand, namely Ica Express, but that concept is 
operated under Statoil Detaljhandel Skandinavia AS with grocery supplies 
coming from Ica Menyföretagen AB. Due to time and resource limitations we 
focused on the other concepts, generating about 98 % of total sales.  
 
Ica’s history begins in 1917 as a wholesale company in the grocery trade. The 
“Ica-idea” was to gather independent retailers for profitable cooperation, 
combining local adjustments with economies of scale. This can be seen as a 
horizontal integration between retailers who then integrated vertically in the 
supply chain to include also wholesale and distribution activities. 
 
The grocery market developed well in 2002. Ica stores in Sweden experienced 
a positive trend with a sales growth of 6.4%, compared to industry growth of 
4.9 %. A market share of 36.4% makes Ica market leader. (Ica Ahold Annual 
 32 
 
Report, 2002) An organizational chart of Ica Sverige AB is illustrated in figure 
7. Hereafter, we refer to Ica Sverige AB simply as Ica. 
 
 
Figure 7: Organizational chart of Ica Sweden AB 
(Ica information material, our translations) 
 
Ica’s structure in Sweden is somewhat different from competitors and from 
their own operations abroad, as Ica stores in Sweden are operated by individual 
retailers as their own companies. The economies of scale are achieved through 
cooperation in central activities such as purchasing, marketing, finance and 
legal departments, business development and IT, as illustrated in figure 7. 
Under the box “Store operations” one can also find the different store concepts. 
The actual concepts and the brand names are owned and controlled by Ica, but 
having independently owned stores are stressed as being the core of the Ica 
idea. (Ica Ahold Report, 2002) Although very interesting and probably 
important for Ica’s success, these organizational matters fall outside the scope 
of this thesis and will not be further discussed. 
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5.2 Ica’s value proposition 
Most people have a fairly good idea of what the value proposition of a typical 
grocery retailer is. There are not any radically divergent business models; the 
resemblances between different retailers are quite extensive, carrying a rather 
large assortment satisfying the needs of people’s nutritional requirements. This 
is the base connecting retailers in this branch, the opportunities to differentiate 
from this is then great. A typical mean of differentiation is assortment depth 
and width, i.e. the number of grocery articles and also the other assortment 
lines such as light bulbs, CD-records, and clothes. This kind of differentiation 
can be complemented with others such as opening hours, personal service, and 
communication strategies. It is difficult to examine the more intangible aspects 
of a value proposition, as it is highly subjective in nature depending on the 
perception of individuals. Anyhow, as expressed by Ica, their mission is: “to be 
the leading retail company with a focus on food” and the “core values” are: 
“personal, simple, inspiring, safe, and modern” (Ica Ahold Report). We will 
hereafter focus on supply chain related aspects of the value proposition; some 
hard data for stores in each format is therefore required. 
 
Maxi Ica Stormarknad 
Number of articles: 35.000 
Store surface area: 10.000 m2 
Sales, average: 339 million SEK 
Sales, total: 11.2 billion SEK 
Number of stores: 33 
 
Ica Supermarket 
Number of articles: 6.000-10.000 
Store surface area: 500-2.000 m2 
Sales, average: 46 million SEK 
Sales, total: 24.8 billion SEK 
Number of stores: 543 
 
Ica Kvantum 
Number of articles: 12.000 
Store surface area: 3.000-4.000 m2 
Sales, average: 166 million SEK 
Sales, total: 20.8 billion SEK 
Number of stores: 125 
 
Ica Nära 
Number of articles: 4000-6000 
Store surface area: <500 m2 
Sales, average: 12 million SEK 
Sales, total: 12.4 billion SEK 
Number of stores: 1.061 
 
Using the variables spatial convenience and product variety from Bucklin’s 
framework for service output, Maxi has low spatial convenience because of 
distant locations. The vast surface area requires locations in non-central areas. 
The product variety is, on the other hand, tremendous with about 35.000 
articles; about half the store’s surface area is made up of home and leisure 
departments. Kvantum has lower service outputs in product variety, as it 
 34 
 
focuses on food and do not have the home and leisure departments. It has 
slightly higher service output on location. Supermarket has a rather high 
service output on location and about half as many articles as Kvantum. Nära is 
kind of neighborhood store concept, hence having the highest spatial 
convenience. The product variety is, then again, the smallest of Ica’s concepts.  
 
One fundamental question in understanding Ica’s value proposition is which 
customer needs are being satisfied. The thing here is that customer’s needs 
differ a lot even during a short period of time. Buying behavior differs 
depending on week days. Customers are more cost conscious Monday to 
Thursday than they are Friday to Sunday. Sometimes shopping is planned in 
advance and sometimes smaller complementary purchases are made. Hence, as 
customers have different needs in different situations one kind of 
differentiation is not sufficient to capture all of a customer’s weakly purchases. 
Ica deals with this problem through their four very different store concepts, 
aiming at meeting the same customer’s shifting needs in different situations.  
 
One of our research questions is about general price levels. In a competitive 
market with low margins, as the grocery market can be considered to be, 
consumer prices are directly influenced by the industry’s average operating 
costs. This means that it is difficult, if not impossible, to outperform 
competitors in service output terms and at the same time having lower prices. 
Hence, in general, price is a function of service level. Looking at competitors 
like Willy’s Hemma, one of Axfood’s store concepts, having central locations 
like Ica Supermarket and Nära, but with a ground assortment of 2.000 articles, 
Ica has a slightly higher price level. The same can be said about German food 
chain Lidl who carries only about 1.000 articles, of which 85% are their own 
brands. This is such a ground assortment that part of their strategy is to find 
locations close to full service stores. A wider assortment usually also means the 
possibility to buy fresh products like cheese, meat, and fish from manually 
operated disks. Compared to pure discount competitors, Ica has higher service 
and higher price levels. Just as Bucklin’s service output theory predicts, the 
higher the service output, the higher is the channel cost, and the higher 
consumer prices. This holds between different companies and between Ica’s 
different store concepts. 
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5.3 How Ica deliver its value proposition 
5.3.1 Nationwide logistics system 
According to Fisher’s (1997) uncertainty framework groceries are functional 
products; product life cycles are long, contribution margins are low, stockout 
rates are low, and forced end-of-season markdowns are unusual. The nature of 
the demand for groceries is relatively stable and predictable. Central for such 
supply chains is focus on physical functions, as the majority of costs lie here, 
mainly within production, transportation, and inventory storage. The market 
mediation costs are thus relatively small. 
 
We ended the previous part concluding that price levels on a competitive 
market are a function of operating costs. Having more than 1760 stores selling 
for about 76 billion SEK in 2002, the physical distribution of voluminous 
groceries is a massive effort. At Ica, logistics costs are considerable; 70-80% of 
operating costs can be referred to as logistics costs. This part will depict Ica’s 
logistics system on a macro level. 
 
Since 1989, Ica has rationalized its logistics system substantially. Back then, 
Ica was operated as three different companies, each having its own computer 
system. Today, that has changed to being one company and one computer 
system with two main areas; one being a market system with information about 
such things as articles, prices, suppliers, and stores and one logistics system 
with information about delivery parameters. The benefits of such an integrated 
system are obvious. 
 
The distribution structure, illustrated in figure 8, has changed as well, from 
having 20 regional distribution centrals (DC) to having nine. Some products are 
not handled by Ica’s logistics system, but are instead delivered directly to stores 
by suppliers themselves. This is the case for most dairy products, soft-drinks, 
and beer. Only one DC, the central warehouse in Västerås, carries the entire 
assortment, including low frequent articles. The other ones carry high-frequent 
goods, which is about 7-8.000 articles. However, not all DCs carry full 
assortment of low frequent goods either. Figure 8 shows which DCs carry what 
assortments. A regional DC delivers goods to stores within a certain area. The 
central warehouse in Västerås delivers the low frequent articles to the other 
DCs, who in turn deliver them to the stores within their area. 
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The reduction from 20 to nine DCs brought along other changes as well. 
Before, all DCs had contacts with all suppliers but after the changes the central 
warehouse in Västerås takes care of most of these contacts with suppliers, i.e. 
for all low frequent articles. So instead of having 20 actors having contacts 
with a great number of suppliers, one actor now performs all that work. Except 
the benefits of reduction of contacts, Ica also experienced minimization of 
inventories, power over freights, and maybe most important: always full 
quantity discount from suppliers. This appears to be a win-win situation for all 
parties as the benefits for suppliers should be extensive as well. The quantity 
discounts now given on all shipments to Ica are probably saved in on larger 
batch sizes and on the reduction from 20 to one delivery location. 
 
 
Figure 8: Ica’s distribution system 
 
The rationalization process of the distribution system does not stopped here. 
Continuous improvements are always looked for and during the time this study 
were being completed, Ica announced that they were going to close down the 
DC in Växjö by 2006. The plan is to build two new DCs, one in Stockholm and 
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one in Helsingborg, and to close down five of the existing DCs, including the 
one in Växjö. The remaining DCs will be re-built to be able to handle the 
capacity increase. (Sundström, 2003) 
 
5.3.2 The work in a distribution centre 
In marketing channel terms, a DC can be thought of as a wholesaler. This part 
will analyze the flow of goods and information between three actors in a supply 
chain: supplier, wholesaler, and retailer. The DC in Kungälv is the focal actor 
here; suppliers and stores are merely referred to in general terms. 
 
The DC delivers goods to about 315 stores in the area stretching from Torsby 
in north, Filipstad in northeast, Hjo in east, Ulricehamn in southeast, to 
Falkenberg in south. Of 450 employees, 270 have logistics related jobs. The 
surface area is 40.500 m2, 45 trucks with trailers, of which 40 are outsourced, 
and 150 lift trucks are used for the physical movement of goods. Of all of Ica’s 
DCs, the one in Kungälv is the most efficient. Figure 9 illustrates the part of the 
supply chain from suppliers to the DC to stores. 
 
 
Figure 9: The product’s way at Ica’s distribution centre in Kungälv 
(Based on a power point presentation by Fredriksson, 2003) 
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drinks, beer, tobacco, and dairy products are directed to suppliers, slow moving 
articles are sent to Västerås, and everything else are sent to Kungälv. 
 
Purchase: This activity is performed by the DC. Purchase is based on orders 
from stores and on forecasts. Forecasting is a complicated activity; some 
personnel at the DC have responsibility for a small category of articles and over 
time they get a good feeling for the demand of those products. These prognoses 
are complemented with campaign prognosis from a department in Stockholm. 
 
Inventory in: This is when goods are coming from suppliers and from DC 
Västerås. As mentioned, dairy products, soft drinks, and beer never pass 
through the DC and are instead transported directly to stores. Tobacco parcels 
are packed according to each store’s specific orders so that DC personnel can 
sort packages directly to each store. Some pallets never appear on the shelves in 
the DC as they are moved straight from inventory in to inventory out, thus 
reducing a lot of work. At this stage sensitive articles are controlled, e.g. on 
temperature. 
 
Inventory out: Goods are sorted according to each store’s orders and put at a 
specific dispatch area. Full pallets and carriages with goods are then lined up 
for delivery. Mistakes in this activity are expensive with a calculated cost of 
200 SEK per error; there are on average 3,5 errors per 1000 parcels. The 
carriages are packed with a holistic view to minimize the unpacking work done 
by store personnel. Articles positioned close to each other in store shelves are 
also packed together in the carriages. Delivery to store takes place day 3, 
usually before noon. 
 
The DC carries a buffer inventory, which imply that goods that are ordered in 
the evening can be packed that next day and delivered the morning after. All in 
all, the lead time from a store order to delivery is less than two full days.  
 
5.4 Ica’s strategic position 
Having looked at Ica’s value proposition and supply chain, the purpose of this 
part is to link the activities delivering the value proposition together in an 
activity map, as well as summarizing the case study. The grey shaded themes in 
figure 10 are those we consider being the strategically most important ones. 
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Figure 10: Activity map of Ica 
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activities are coordinated between stores, DCs, and suppliers. JIT also favors 
small shipments, which is necessary fore the smaller store formats, who prefer 
not to handle full pallets; this, together with the short lead time from store order 
to delivery, also allow stores to carry minimal inventory.  
 
Continuous replenishment, an operational practice developed on JIT and ECR 
thinking, builds on extensive and automatic usage of point-of-sales data. One of 
the main goals with continuous replenishment is reducing errors and order 
processing costs. As we have seen, only 9% of the products are ordered 
automatically, so this is definitely an area in which Ica has an opportunity to 
improve. There is a lot of time to be saved for store personnel, as ordering with 
portable hand scanners, telephone, and Intranet is much more time consuming. 
 
Regarding the relationship between price and service level we have come 
across one thing that neutralizes this effect at Ica. It is more resource 
consuming for DCs to serve small Ica Nära stores than it is to serve Ica Maxi 
and Ica Kvantum stores, but this is not reflected in the store’s purchase prices; 
all stores have the same purchase prices, irrespective of quantities. One could 
therefore say that bigger stores, to a small extent, subsidize smaller ones.  
 
The need for tradeoffs arises for example from inconsistencies in image and 
incompatible product and service attributes (Porter, 1996). Therefore Ica does 
not have any pure discount store concept carrying the Ica brand within this 
distribution system; Ica Aholds’s discount concept Netto is another company 
with its own distribution system (much smaller than Ica’s, but under 
development). Ica’s pure convenient store concept Express is supplied through 
Ica Menyföretagen’s distribution system, which is constructed for deliveries to 
very small stores and restaurants.  
 
Another tradeoff concerning the Ica Nära stores is also being made this 
autumn. Ica has put an ultimatum on the smallest stores that are not yet 
computerized to invest in such systems. Otherwise they will have to leave Ica, 
but are instead offered to receive supplies from Ica Menyföretagen. 
(Sundström, 2003) The main reason for this is most certainly cost, since 
telephone orders are much more costly to serve. 
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6 Time-based competition 
 
Having detected the patterns outlining competition based on cost and physical 
efficiency, the purpose of this theoretical chapter is to explore the supply chain 
variables significant for time and market responsiveness.   
 
6.1 Why time is important 
Christopher (1998) proposes three areas in which the importance of time as a 
competitive variable are increasing according to the need to meet the fast 
changing markets of today: 
• shortening life cycles 
• the drive for reduced inventories 
• volatile markets making reliance on forecasts dangerous. 
 
In accordance with technological improvements as well as societal changes, 
product life cycles have been radically shortened the last few decades. It is 
within this time to market scenario companies must be able to capture an 
opportunity, develop, manufacture and distribute products in accordance with 
the existing market pace, and if successful, the actual time that can be saved 
while performing these activities becomes crucial as late market entrances 
increase the risk for obsolete stock. (Christopher, 1998) 
 
Regarding the drive for reduced inventories, many companies have realized the 
need to release inventory holding costs. Time to serve, i.e. order to delivery 
time is also important as companies need to be able to respond to demand of 
products that are already on the market, i.e. the lead time to resupply a product 
determines the organizations ability to meet demand during the life cycle, 
which is also the base for the concept of quick response which will be 
discussed later on. (Ibid) 
 
The volatility of markets is a popular topic to discuss and as forecasting is 
becoming increasingly crucial due to companies’ attempts to reduce lead times, 
managers seek new methods to reduce forecast errors; still the real problem 
would be that forecast errors increases as lead time increases. Time to react, i.e. 
responsiveness, is essentially achieved through time compression in the supply 
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chain and the costs should be lower at the same time. Still, the system of having 
suppliers able to deliver a complete order at required time might simply shift 
the cost burden from one part of the supply chain to another. (Ibid) 
 
There is a direct relationship between the length (measured in time) of a supply 
chain and the inventory carrying cost, but the declared truism “time is money” 
is arguably more true for companies supplying innovative products with 
unpredictable demand than it is for others. Besides the release of capital, 
shorter lead times also mean higher service level because of the faster response 
to consumer demand. Higher flexibility in meeting demand also makes 
companies less vulnerable to market volatility. Reducing lead times generally 
means higher distribution costs; benefits must be weighed against costs. It is 
motivated with an increase in distribution costs when it leads to a decrease in 
market mediation costs. (Ibid) 
 
High volatility in demand for innovative products motivates high distribution 
costs, but more important on time sensitive markets where time-to-market 
reductions are extremely important, shorter lead times not only mean lower 
cost but also higher sales. This, together with avoidance of market mediation 
costs, is the biggest difference between cost-based and time-based competition. 
(Ibid) 
 
6.2 The lead-time gap 
As shown in figure 11, the lead-time gap is based upon the problem that the 
time it takes to produce and deliver a product is longer than a retailer is willing 
to wait. 
 
 
Figure 11: The lead-time gap 
(Christopher, 1998, p.168) 
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Christopher (1998) argues that the traditional way to meet the lead-time gap is 
to hold inventory, hence forecasting need to be used and as the accuracy of 
such actions are prone to errors the whole idea will more likely end up in an 
inventory problem. Therefore, a company that achieves a perfect match 
between the logistics lead-time and the retailer’s order cycle will have no usage 
for forecasts and no need for inventory. Whether or not the above statement is 
of a utopian character, closing this lead-time gap might be possible by:  
• shortening the logistics lead time 
• moving the retailer’s order cycle closer by attaining earlier warning of 
requirements through improved visibility of demand  
 
These two approaches might then reduce the gap between the two lead times, 
and even close it as shown in figure 12. 
 
 
Figure 12: Closing the lead-time gap 
(Christopher, 1998, p.169) 
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ible and to reduce set-ups and set-up times if appropriate. However, non-bottle 
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at the actual bottle necks, i.e. the output of non-bottle necks feeding bottle 
necks must be governed by the requirements of the bottle necks they assist.  
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with suppliers, hence suppliers are forced to use forecasting and carry 
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order cycles, i.e. finding approaches how to capture earlier warnings of the 
customer’s requirements. Considering the fact that real demand is hidden from 
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view except from already made orders, the idea behind the demand penetration 
point becomes useful in this case. The demand penetration point could be 
described as the point in the supply chain where real demand meets the 
projected plan; upstream from this point everything is driven by a forecast. 
Therefore, new ways should be invented on how the penetration point might be 
pushed as far as possible upstream; one way would be to improve the speed and 
accuracy of information from the market place to manufacturers. Another way 
to push the order penetration point upstream would be to postpone the final 
commitment of the product to its final form. A frequently used example of a 
postponement strategy is Benetton, who makes knitwear and then dyes 
everything the last thing they do, according to customer requirements collected 
during and after production. 
 
6.3 Quick response 
If ECR was the JIT-based umbrella term for supply chain cooperation in the 
grocery industry, quick response (QR) is the fashion and apparel industry 
version. Essentially, the idea behind QR is to reap advantages of time-based 
competition by developing systems that are responsive and fast, employing the 
old cliché “the right product in the right place at the right time”. The foundation 
of QR would never have been possible without the development of information 
technology in general and EDI in particular. The reasoning behind QR is that 
demand is captured as close to real time as possible; the end customer triggers 
the system with his or her purchases, i.e. a response is then made directly as a 
result of this information. QR could also be seen as a classic case of the 
substitution of information for inventory, even though QR might have a high 
fixed cost, the incremental costs of service improvements should be 
proportionately low. (Christopher, 1998) 
 
It has been said that following a QR concept, the fashion and apparel industry 
could gain significant advantages in lowered forced markdowns, stockouts and 
inventory carrying costs, but in one condition: all parties in an entire chain need 
to adopt QR. If doing so, the aim should be to link retail sales with garment 
manufacturers, who are linked to textile producers who are linked to suppliers 
of fibres. In a traditional inventory-based system, unexpected short-term 
demand for products add additional costs in the form of changes in production 
and distribution schedules, affecting the end result negatively in form of higher 
levels of stockouts, hence decreased service for end customers. (ibid) 
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6.4 Product flow analysis 
6.4.1 Processes as a way to analyze product flows  
As processes are abstract concepts they need to be modeled in some way to be 
understood. Among the most widely accepted definitions of a process is “a set 
of interrelated activities” (Kock, 1999, p.28) and “a chain of activities” 
(Ljungberg and Larsson, 2001, p.43). In this respect, processes are seen as 
activity flows, or workflows, consisting of activities that have some kind of 
relationship to each other. Thus, if activities are not perceived interrelated, they 
are not part of the same process. However, processes are not real structures, 
merely mental abstractions; as Kock (1999) illustrates it, although flowcharts 
can show that data or materials flow between activities in a process, the data or 
material do not actually flow between activities; rather they flow between 
organizational functions (or roles). Process-focus has been the main idea in 
many widely adopted management approaches such as total quality 
management and business process reengineering (Kock, 1999). 
 
A horizontal cross-company process perspective means having a holistic view 
on the supply chain. The most well known model having this standpoint is 
Porter’s (1985) value chain model, in which a company’s value chain is set into 
a larger context – the value system. Perhaps no innovation1, Porter’s 
pedagogical and rhetorical skills made his value chain model incredibly 
widespread. Having an end customer perspective, all activities that the chain 
performs should add value, an idea that is also the core of SCM. A traditional 
model of a supply chain is illustrated in figure 13 below. With such a linear 
functional view, products, information, and finances flow through channel 
members towards end customers. 
 
 
Figure 13: Functional view of supply chains 
(Kopczak and Johnson, 2003, p.29) 
                                          
1 According to Jönsson (1995, p.179), Swedish mill bookkeeping from the eighteenth century was constructed 
with a similar logic as that of the value chain, as was the accounting plans introduced in Germany in the 1920s 
mainly developed by Eugen Schmalenbach.  
Suppliers  Manufacturers    Distributors     Retailers    End Customer 
Products, Information, Finances
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Still, the functional model does not give a fair picture of how the work is 
actually carried out. According to Kopczak and Johnson (2003), the breath and 
power of SCM comes across in the process view of SCM: 
 
“When the multi-company nature of the supply-chain diagram is combined with a 
process-flow diagram, one can see that supply-chain management is not just about 
order fulfillment; it must be part and parcel of product design, introduction, promotion, 
fulfillment and recycling.” (p.28) 
 
A process view, illustrated in figure 14, focuses on the life cycle of products 
instead of on channel members. In such a model, the channel members are 
involved in many different processes. 
 
 
Figure 14: Process view of supply chains 
(Kopczak and Johnson, 2003, p.29) 
 
An even more comprehensive picture of the supply chain is given in figure 15. 
In this model Kopczak and Johnson (2003) suggest that the accomplishment of 
these processes is more than just a sequential handoff of materials, information 
or finances from member to member. Instead it involves a collaborative effort 
among all the members in the supply chain. In this respect it starts to resemble 
a network more than a chain. Moreover, in this model, the roles vary from the 
traditional view; some activities that traditionally were performed by one actor 
may now be performed by someone else. Retailers may have, for example, 
completely taken over the products design activities that were traditionally 
performed by manufacturers. 
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Figure 15: Network view on supply chains 
(Kopczak and Johnson, 2003, p.29) 
 
By conducting a product flow analysis one can detect where in a supply chain 
that the bottlenecks cause problems as well as when and where products are 
locked up in inventory. Christopher (1998) divides the time of performing 
activities into either being value adding or only cost adding. Figure 16 
illustrates how the reduction of the so-called cost adding time can reduce costs 
and at the same time improve service. 
 
 
Figure 16: Cost-adding versus value-adding time 
(Christopher, 1998, p.163) 
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6.5 Activity map with a time-based theme 
In chapter 3, which dealt with cost-based competition, an activity map of Ikea 
was given as an example of how supply chain activities were linked together to 
reinforce Ikea’s value proposition. Similar, but in time-based competition, an 
activity map with mutually reinforcing activities performed by the Spanish 
company Inditex’ retail chain Zara is depicted in figure 17. 
 
 
Figure 17: Activity map of Zara 
(Porter, 2003) 
 
Zara copes with the problems in fashion clothing retailing by having extremely 
short lead times. Their strategy is essentially based on performing production 
activities in Europe, enabling them to shorten lead times compared to most 
competitors who produce in the Far East. Zara also use forecasts in a different 
way as they always produce a little less than the forecasted demand as well as 
not making high numbers of each unit. This enables Zara to have higher and 
more stable demand for their products at the same time as the short lead time 
increases responsiveness during the product life cycles, which in turn reduces 
inventory holding costs. (Christopher, 1998)  
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7 Case 3: Lindex 
 
The study’s third and last case company is the fashion clothing retailer Lindex, 
operating in a sector that according to the theoretical framework has a market 
responsive focus where time is a crucial competitive factor. 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Lindex was established in 1954, and initially specialized in women’s 
underwear. The company has expanded since then, going from offering 
products in one store to become a multinational retail chain with stores in 
Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Germany. In 2002 Lindex acquired Twilfit, a 
retail chain specialized in lingerie, in order to increase the market share in 
women’s underwear in general, and create a stronger position in the exclusive 
segment in particular. The acquisition has meant that Lindex now operate 
through two different retail chains. All in all, Lindex have 401 stores, with 179 
stores in Sweden, 87 in Norway, 47 in Finland, and 30 in Germany, while 58 
stores are Twilfit, all of which are located in Sweden. The total sales of the 
financial year August 2002 to September 2003 were 5.312 million SEK and the 
result (pre tax) was 273 million SEK. (Lindex Year-End Report, 2002/2003)  
 
The Lindex chain concentrates on three different product segments: ladies’ 
wear, lingerie and children’s clothing, with each segment representing roughly 
one third of total sales. Twilfit’s focus is mainly on lingerie with a small part 
coming from women’s clothing. Significant for both chains is that no men’s 
wear is offered, hence Lindex position themselves as a company only focusing 
on women. Lindex had a lingerie focus from the beginning, and this core 
competence has been kept, thus one could say that the company’s strength lies 
within underwear as Lindex is considered to be the market leader within this 
segment. (Lindex Annual Report, 2002; Andersson, 2003) 
 
According to the organizational structure of Lindex (shown in Figure 18) 
people responsible for each segment work towards people responsible for sales 
in each country. Having this matrix structure, the people representing each 
segment are fed directly with information regarding sales and demand from 
each country, which enable country based decisions regarding assortment 
variety. 
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Figure 18: Organizational chart of Lindex group 
(Lindex information material) 
 
7.2 Lindex’ value proposition 
In order to reveal what we believe is Lindex’ value proposition, we will try 
answer the questions how, where and when Lindex create value for their 
customers. While answering these questions we will also disclose who their 
customers are. Having a business strategy of offering women inspiring fashion 
for every day, Lindex utilize Every Day Fashion as a slogan and the company’s 
underwear focus is declared as they claim we have underwear for all women. In 
order to emphasize what Lindex is with their female focus, the company claims 
all products are created by women for women, which we also believe is an 
attempt to increase their brand awareness among their customers. The 
company’s three main product segments will be discussed, starting with 
lingerie as this segment is most significant for the brand Lindex.  
 
7.2.1 Lingerie 
As Lindex was initially a lingerie company, this tradition has been kept, 
especially as their proposed core competence is said to be to design and 
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produce lingerie with the best fit. As each woman is unique, Lindex aim of 
offering underwear to all women has made them specialists on designing 
underwear, claiming they are able to offer one cut for every curve. Whether or 
not this statement is true, Lindex extensive variety of fit and size on their 
products has inevitably brought the company to a market leading position in 
Sweden, holding about 20% of the total market share. With this information in 
mind, it may not be surprising that Lindex market share in the bra segment is 
over 50%. Once again we refer this strong position to their extensive 
knowledge regarding fit and number of varieties, which we believe are clearly 
mirrored by the fact that they offer 1.894 different variants of bras thus 
increasing the probability that any female will find a product that satisfies her 
specific needs considering fit and model. Lindex ability to offer all women 
underwear increased with the company’s acquisition of Twilfit, thus this could 
be seen as a strategic move in order to increase their market share in the more 
exclusive lingerie segment. Twilfit’s products do have a higher price level and 
are therefore targeting females who demand higher quality and more exclusive 
materials.  
 
Due to the above discussion, we assume that the females, who have purchased 
their lingerie at Lindex, but have developed the need for better quality and a 
higher level of fashion over the years, are more likely to satisfy their needs at 
Twilfit. If this is true, Lindex will cover this group of women as well, 
increasing the chances that females will continue to buy products from either 
one of the chains throughout their life.  
 
Perhaps the newly introduced store concept called Favorites, offering only 
lingerie and cosmetics, will close the gap between Lindex and Twilfit, further 
increasing Lindex total market share in lingerie. These stores are designed to 
look like they are more exclusive and sensual than the ordinary Lindex stores, 
thus appealing to a target group that might not afford to shop at Twilfit but still 
want more exclusiveness than the ordinary Lindex stores offers. Significant for 
the Favorites stores is also the smaller format, enabling locations in areas 
where an ordinary Lindex store would have been too big. The Favorites 
concept was introduced very recently, which mean Lindex were not able to 
provide us with any information regarding profitability and impact on the 
Swedish lingerie market.    
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7.2.2 Ladies’ wear 
The segment called Ladies’ wear include, except from the ordinary Ladies’ 
wear assortment, two divisions called Mom and Generous. Lindex claim all 
Ladies wear are designed with the same standards regarding fit as their lingerie 
products. In order to further amplify the importance of fit, Lindex have 
developed the Mom assortment, which are clothing designed with pregnant 
females in mind, thus this division represent a stage that most women go 
through one or more times in life. By offering this kind of clothing, Lindex 
might keep their customers through the period in life in which women cannot 
wear ordinary clothes, adding to the statement one cut for every curve. As soon 
as these women give birth, they can start purchasing products from the ordinary 
ladies wear assortment as usual.  
 
Generous, targets women in need of sizes greater than the ordinary women 
assortment offers. These clothes are designed with an emphasis on fit as well, 
but do still have the same fashion level as the ordinary ladies assortment. 
Offering clothing that are more generous in sizes call for a total coverage of the 
market, providing a supplementary reason for this target group to purchase 
clothes at Lindex as well, not only lingerie. Having this total market strategy 
with the different concepts, most women should be able to find products that 
match her specific clothing and lingerie needs, even though it changes through 
life.   
 
7.2.3 Children’s wear 
Lindex’ children’s wear concept is mainly divided into three segments. The 
first segment target smaller children in the ages 0 to 6, the next segment focus 
on school children 7 to 13 and the last segment is called pre teen and thereby 
targeting girls 10 to 14 years old. All children’s wear are designed by Lindex 
and the company claim these products represent good design, quality, and fit.  
 
The smaller children’s clothing are also designed according to functionality 
standards as these children often are dependent upon their parents, while having 
a low to moderate level of fashion. The school children’s clothing has a higher 
level of fashion but still the main focus is towards fit. Pre teen is said to be 
focusing on girls who are about to become more aware of their individuality, 
leaving the child stage and taking the first steps towards the teenage stage. Still, 
this girl is too young to decide completely by herself what to buy, but as her 
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parent brings her to the store she will have some input in the decision-making 
process. The reason Lindex do not offer products specifically targeting 
teenagers are more likely due to teenagers’ search for independence, thus it is 
particularly hard to persuade teenagers to follow successive purchase 
behaviors. In turn, we believe the company hopes the girls will return to 
Lindex’ stores after having left the fluctuating teenage period. 
 
We believe the answers to the question why Lindex offer children’s wear at all 
are two folded. Firstly, as Lindex have a female only focus, offering children’s 
clothing could be considered as a service due to the convenience it provides for 
the mothers who can purchase both their own clothing and their children’s 
clothes in the same store. We also consider this to be strategically beneficial as 
we believe it is more common that it is the mother’s responsibility to purchase 
the children’s clothes. Secondly, it provides an opportunity for Lindex to create 
brand awareness and thereby customer loyalty. Children who grow-up with 
Lindex branded clothes, mostly females in the school age, will probably 
continue to purchase products, no matter if it is clothes or underwear, 
throughout their lives. Of course, this is our assumption but the likelihood for 
this scenario to happen increases once these children became older. 
     
According to our interviewee, Lindex is number one or two on children’s wear 
in Sweden at the moment. This we believe, would not be possible if the 
standards mentioned regarding quality, functionality, fit, level of fashion, and 
price was not competitive. Maybe the real effects from this strategy will be 
seen later on, when the children who got their clothes from Lindex today start 
to bring their children to the company’s stores. 
 
7.2.4 Customer interface 
The fashion industry play by other rules compared to, for example, the grocery 
industry and one of the main differences is how a fashion company present 
themselves for their customers. The fashion retailers need to motivate and 
inspire people to come to their stores in order to buy their products. Partly, this 
could be seen as contrary to the customer patterns found within the grocery 
industry, as all people need food for survival on a daily basis but they do not 
need clothing to the same extent. In order to face the consolidated fashion 
market, general trends in society and to live up to their brand name, Lindex 
stretches the importance of their stores as their most important marketing tool. 
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Lindex believe the purchasing patterns of today are changing towards more 
spontaneous shopping, which is why an actor like Lindex need to have store 
concepts that oblige people to shop, of course the products offered are as 
important but reaching excellence in just one of these variables will more likely 
not lead to overall success. Due to these requirements, Lindex faces the 
challenge of creating stores that appeal to all their customers. Lindex have 
started to focus on visual merchandising in order for the stores to accurately 
represent the company’s clothing, which in turn are said to represent the 
modern woman who are aware of her own integrity and design trends.  
 
Throughout this part we have discussed variables that we believe do have an 
impact on how customers perceive Lindex and the different assortments 
offered. The high market share the company possesses in lingerie in general, 
and bras in particular, are more likely due to the great variety in sizes and 
models offered, thus supporting Bucklin’s framework regarding service output, 
i.e. Lindex great variety is reflected by the high market share they possess. The 
last section will reveal what we believe are Lindex’ value proposition 
 
7.2.5 Summary 
Lindex different concepts reveal a strategy solely focusing on women, whereas 
the foundation is fit, i.e. one cut for every curve and that all products come in 
enough sizes and variances that all women should be able to find something 
that fit her specific needs. The different segments of ladies’ wear and lingerie 
satisfies women in different phases in life according to her specific needs; the 
Mom concept covers pregnant women’s requirements and the Generous 
concept offer greater sizes than the ordinary Ladies’ wear assortment. 
Simultaneously, children’s clothing can be purchased from the same store. 
With the complementary assortment offered by Twilfit, the women demanding 
more exclusive lingerie should be satisfied as well. 
 
Modified and shortened, we assume Lindex’ value proposition as: Customers 
should be attracted by inspiring stores and inspiring products, significant with 
Lindex’ strategy of offering every day fashion products having a moderate 
price level, good quality and the right fit, for every woman at any point in life. 
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7.3 How Lindex delivers its value proposition 
The intention with this part is to analyze and depict the supply chain related 
activities that Lindex performs when delivering their value proposition. One 
limitation is made here. The recently bought retail chain Twilfit’s supply chain 
activities have not yet been integrated into Lindex; Twilfit will therefore be 
excluded here. Employing Fishers (1997) framework for the nature of product 
demand, the products supplied by Lindex are primarily innovative 
characterized by having unpredictable demand, short life cycles, high 
contribution margin, and high product variety. Lindex gross margin for 
2002/2003 was 56.3%, defined as sales less expenditure for sold products as a 
percentage of sales; the width of the product variety can be exemplified by the 
fact that Lindex has no less 1.894 bra-variants (<http://www.lindex.se>). 
 
The average forecast and stockout rates for clothes are much higher than for 
functional products, as are the forced end-of-season markdowns. Compared 
with efficient supply chains for voluminous groceries, clothing supply chains’ 
primary focus is being market responsive keeping market mediation costs as 
low as possible. The aim is to make sure that products reaching the market 
match consumer demand as cost will appear when supply exceeds demand 
(markdowns) and when demand exceeds supply (lost sales, dissatisfied 
customers). (Fisher, 1997) 
 
Drawing upon the process framework described in chapter 6, we will go 
through the activity steps from budgeting and planning of assortments to store 
deliveries and demand fulfillment. In order to make it easier for the reader to 
understand, we start this chapter with an overview of what we consider being 
the most important supply chain activities that are performed in Lindex’ supply 
chain. A simplified version is illustrated in figure 19, based on our findings. 
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Figure 19: Activities in Lindex’ supply chain 
 
7.3.1 Budgeting and planning 
A planning period at Lindex consists of three months, hence a year is divided in 
four quarters; one quarter could for example be August to October. When a 
quarter has passed, the product segment and country responsible persons meet 
in the matrix (see figure 18), evaluate the past quarter’s performance and start 
preparing that same quarter next year, hence nine months in advance. Historical 
data are analyzed, sales and product plans are developed, and the design work 
starts. Fashion trends are considered, rough assortment sketches are prepared 
(so called “story boards”) and gross product lists are developed. Sales and 
budgeting plans are decided upon; assortments are planned monthly and 
budgets quarterly. This process takes six weeks.  
 
7.3.2 Product development 
When the above activities are completed the detailed design work starts, based 
upon story boards and product lists. Of all products sold 90% are in-house 
designed, the rest are complementary purchases of either external brands or of 
already designed items offered by suppliers. As different product categories 
have different lead times, the final design of garments is postponed as late as 
possible; the reason is that it is best to make the final fashion decisions as close 
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to season and product delivery as possible,  recalling Christopher’s (1998) 
argument that forecast errors decrease as lead time decreases.  
 
When it comes to product branding Lindex offers own brands (“by Lindex” and 
others) as well as external brands. The purpose with the external brands is to 
add credibility and exclusivity or to cover small spots in Lindex’ own 
assortment; the proportion of external brands’ total sales is however very small. 
Lindex product branding strategy is illustrated in figure 20. 
 
 
Figure 20: Product branding strategies 
 
The own product brands for lingerie, which is the only product segment 
containing external brands, could be divided into the “By Lindex” brand, other 
own brands (e.g. Ella May), and external brands (e.g. Triumph). The aim with 
the own brands is that consumers should perceive them as external brands and 
more exclusive than the “By Lindex” brand. The profit margin of external 
brands is low, so the branding strategy is to position own brands close to 
external brands, but a little cheaper and only a little less fashionable aiming at 
being perceived as more price worthy. Even though own brands cost less, profit 
margins is high, much higher than both “By Lindex” products and external 
brands. An example of an own brand in the children’s clothing segment that by 
most customers is perceived as external is Fix. That brand was purchased in 
1996 and has allowed Lindex to stretch their in-house designed children 
products to a more exclusive segment, with 15-20% higher price level. 
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7.3.3 Purchasing and freights 
A prerequisite to be able to deliver the value proposition is that Lindex has a 
well functioning system of suppliers that manufactures the products designed at 
the head office in Sweden. Lindex strive for high control over the supply chain, 
as it is the foundation for matching market demand. The backbone in this work 
is claimed to be a global network of purchasing offices. Between 1994 and 
2001 Lindex established six such offices in Hong Kong, Istanbul, Dhaka, 
Bucharest, New Delhi, and Shanghai. Through these offices Lindex gets closer 
geographically as well as juridical, with increased opportunities to source 
(arrange purchases) to the right country and supplier regarding price, quality 
and export/import regulations. Having local purchasing offices also simplifies 
the process of making sure that codes of conducts concerning factories’ work 
environment is followed.  
 
Similar to most clothing retailers Lindex has outsourced production to low 
wage countries. The decision to manufacture in the Far East or Eastern Europe 
is very common; the fact that clothing manufacture is still labor intensive has 
meant that developing countries competing with low wages have been able to 
gain market shares, thus leading to an increased internationalization in the 
industry. In Sweden, the import share of the total clothing industry was 95 % in 
1995 (Nationalencyklopedin). A share we believe has increased. All Lindex’ 
suppliers are located in Eastern Europe or in South or East Asia. The level of 
cooperation with suppliers varies, as illustrated in figure 21. 
 
 
 Figure 21: Classification of Lindex’ suppliers 
 (Lindex information material) 
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Our interviewee estimates that approximately 70% of Lindex 400 suppliers are 
so called basic suppliers, 15% is suppliers for development, 10% is to be 
phased out, and 5% are strategic suppliers. A guideline is that Lindex should 
not represent more than 30% of any single supplier’s sales, if so the relation 
must be taken to a deeper level. Around 10 suppliers have Lindex as their only 
customer. Lindex evaluates their suppliers twice a year with a balanced 
scorecard approach with measures on gross profitability, delivery accuracy, 
order quality, and number of consumer complaints. 
 
An estimate is that the number of suppliers will be reduced to about 300 in a 
few years; the goal is to have deeper relationships with the remaining suppliers. 
The relation with strategic suppliers in figure 21 resembles what is often 
depicted in literature about SCM. These relationships are characterized of 
mutual dependency and trust; one example would be that garments are not 
quality controlled. 
 
Of all products sold at Lindex, 65% are produced in the South or East Asia and 
35% is manufactured in Eastern Europe. The decision where to produce 
depends on several variables, e.g. fashion level, price competition on consumer 
markets, and suppliers’ expertise. The best lingerie is stated to be produced in 
China. Children’s clothing is extremely price sensitive and must therefore be 
produced where it is cheapest, i.e. in Asia. Also, children’s clothing is not as 
fashion sensitive either, hence lead times is not as crucial as it is for ladies’ 
wear. The product lead times is illustrated in figure 22. 
 
 
Figure 22: Product lead times 
(Lindex information material) 
 
The “basic flow” in figure 22 is made up of products with long life cycles, 
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continuous replenishment basis with lead times on 1-3 weeks, which implies 
that products are held as inventory somewhere in the supply chain. The “quick 
flow” is products that are either re-bought in-season or completely new 
products but still in-season. This is products with high fashion risk and lead 
times on 6-12 weeks. The “collection flow” is seasonal purchases with high 
design level and low or medium fashion risk. These lines have the longest lead 
times, 12-26 weeks, and optimal prices are sought from suppliers.  
 
When it comes to freights, everything that is produced in Europe is delivered 
by truck. Depending on the time pressure on clothes produced in Asia, Lindex 
can choose to have it delivered by sea (4 weeks), by air (days), or the 
combination sea-air (2 weeks). The fastest lead times from order to delivery are 
6 weeks and the average is 14 weeks. The fastest lead times have products 
produced in Turkey. Lindex buys all shipments themselves believing they will 
get better prices compared to suppliers due to the position as a big freight 
purchaser. That also enables more control over the supply chain. Next section 
deals with the final distribution activities before the products arrive in stores. 
 
7.3.4 Quick response 
Lindex’ has recently invested in a new distribution center north of Gothenburg. 
This QR project started during the autumn 2002 and involves implementation 
of a new logistics and IT system. It is expected that that the QR project will be 
completed within one or two years. The DC and the shipments to stores are a 
third party logistic solution outsourced to Schenker. Before, Lindex did not 
have a DC but instead applied a cross-docking approach; products were 
shipped to a warehouse where they were sorted according to stores after a quite 
standardized allocation basis. Today after the QR implementation about 50% of 
the clothes that arrive to the DC are forwarded to stores after a detailed 
allocation basis. The remaining 50% is held as picking inventory and is 
delivered to stores based on sales, i.e. fact based distribution. This system leads 
to a more even product flow and a reduced need for stores to carry inventory, 
which is strategically important due to high store rents which makes holding 
inventory at store level expensive. Instead stores will get continuous 
replenishments, which in the end will allow Lindex stores to increase the sales 
areas without raising rents. Today the continuous replenishment system works 
for basic garments which can be delivered every second day, but in the future it 
will work also for items with higher fashion level. 
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All in all, the QR and IT implementation leads Lindex into fact based retailing. 
Sales data can be analyzed more easily with the new IT system and used when 
grading stores’ assortment. Such grading has been difficult and costly before. 
When fully implemented the project’s IT system will enable a detailed store 
grading arrangement, stores in small and medium sized cities will have a nar-
rower assortment and a lower overall fashion level. All in all, the purpose is to 
get “the right product to the right store in the right time” <www.lindex.com>. 
 
7.4 Lindex’ strategic position 
In order to investigate Lindex strategic position we have produced an activity 
map as in the two earlier case studies, and figure 23 is the result regarding how 
we believe their value proposition is contained in their company specific set of 
tailored activities designed to deliver it. As Lindex is in the process of changing 
their business model, we will here make the assumption that the intended 
changes are realized. 
 
 
Figure 23: Activity map of Lindex 
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Lindex value proposition basically revealed that the company offer fashion 
clothing for women, marked as a higher order strategic theme in order to show 
the significance. Following this belief, Fisher (1997) argue companies offering 
fashion apparel need to have a responsive supply chain as such products are 
said to be innovative, thus deployment of a physically efficient process would 
direct a mismatch between the value chain and the product. The primary focus 
of such a market responsive process is to respond quickly to unpredictable 
demand in order to minimize stockouts, obsolete stocks and forced markdowns, 
which argues that any company trying to be responsive need to invest 
aggressively in ways to reduce lead-time, as this is the focal point. However, 
Lindex have different lead-time flows for different products depending on level 
of fashion. We believe this set up argues Lindex have adopted a combination of 
Dvorak and Paasschen’s (1996) retail strategies of fast to market and waves of 
fresh assortment. The fast to market strategy include making trade offs in the 
form of cost for speed and flexibility, which could be exemplified by the fact 
that some of Lindex high fashion risk products are transported from the 
supplier by air freight, as a shorter lead time reduce the risk for obsolete stocks. 
The second strategy implies that one should try to reside with longer lead times 
in order to drive lower purchase costs, while balancing speed and cost using 
low cost transportation modes like shipping by boat. Children’s clothing are 
one product segment that has a lower fashion risk and small margins, thus 
Lindex have to live with longer lead times and more cost efficient 
transportation for this segment.   
 
Christopher’s (1998) three variables characterizing the importance of time: 
shorter life cycles, reduced inventory and increased volatility of markets, are all 
areas that Lindex try to cope with by implementing the new QR system, thus 
increasing responsiveness. All activities along their supply chain need to be 
arranged and structured according to the system, optimizing the time to market 
according to the existing market pace, as any late market entrance for higher 
fashion risk products increase the risk for obsolete stocks. Lindex have 
established purchase offices in each country of production as the closeness to 
production sites ensures more efficient control, claiming that they, for example, 
can make quick adjustments if trading quotas change in a specific country of 
production. As Lindex deploy a responsive supply chain, Fisher (1997) argues 
such companies need to select suppliers primarily based upon speed, flexibility 
and quality, which argues the on site surveillance increase Lindex ability to 
control and respond to situations or manufacturing related problems in a more 
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efficient manner, thus shortening the lead times. Also, integration with strategic 
suppliers occurs, with shared goals, risks and returns, leading to mutual 
dependency and more efficient resource allocation as well as increased control 
over these activities. 
 
Lindex have with the establishment of the new distribution center taken a first 
step towards reduced inventories and shorter order to delivery time or time to 
serve. The new arrangement forward about 50% of the clothes that arrive to the 
DC to the stores while the remaining 50% is held as picking inventory, and is 
delivered to stores based on sales. The fact based distribution system leads to a 
more even product flow and reduces the need for stores to carry surplus 
inventory. This set up of inventory surplus reduction release inventory holding 
costs, as the cost for holding inventory is less at the DC than the stores, hence 
allowing a substitution of information for inventory. It also makes Lindex more 
effective when responding to demand of existing products, thus continuous 
replenishment is cost saving and increases the service level for the end 
customer at the same time. One could possibly state that all activities 
accumulated ads to Lindex ability to be responsive as a short time to react 
reduces the risk for forecast errors, thus shortened lead times have become the 
key for sustainable competitive advantage in the fashion industry.   
 
Following our configuration analysis of Lindex, all the activities in the figure 
should be reinforced through all other activities, and thereby enabling Lindex 
to deliver their value proposition. As for all companies, Lindex strategic 
position would not be sustainable unless they had made tradeoffs with other 
positions, meaning that if changing some strategic activities the value 
proposition might fail to deliver what is expected. The most obvious trade off is 
the company’s strategy off focusing solely on women. All things being equal, 
this choice should increase Lindex strength and ability in producing clothing 
and lingerie for women as no resources is allocated for male wear development 
and production. Since Lindex core competence is said to be fit, this means fit 
regarding products made for women, and as the company has a long tradition in 
producing lingerie their female focus is a way of strategically positioning 
themselves from the rest of the market. If Lindex were to start producing items 
for men as well, they would have to learn how to design and develop products 
with a great fit for men as well, which more likely would decrease the attention 
towards the female segments, possibly leading to a smaller share in the ladies 
clothing and lingerie market. 
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Lindex choice of outsourcing all production could be seen as a trade off as 
there are a number of other possibilities. Furvik and Jörnmark 
(in Nationalencyklopedin, 2003) argue companies in the industrialized part of 
the world have developed three strategies to cope with the low wage 
competition from the developing countries: (1) To perform activities like 
design and product development in the home country and place manufacturing 
in a low wage area. (2) Manufacture close to the market using the knowledge 
about the market and fashion trends, thereby reducing lead times, and thus be 
able to introduce new clothes on the market earlier than competitors producing 
in low wage areas. (3) To focus on more advanced products like work, 
protection and sport clothes, or niche products for special local markets. With 
regards to this discussion, Lindex has deployed a combination of the first and 
second strategies as 65% of their products are produced in the South or East 
Asia and 35% is manufactured in Eastern Europe, which is closer to the market. 
The decision where to produce depends on fashion level, price competition on 
consumer markets, and suppliers’ expertise.  
 
Following this discussion, we know that Zara is using the second strategy as 
they produce most of their products in Europe. This choice is crucial as their 
main strategy is to be extremely responsive towards shifting trends, thus they 
need to have the shortest lead times. This is also true for Lindex but only for 
the parts of their segments that are more fashionable. If Lindex were to produce 
these products in Asia, they would probably experience lower production costs 
but longer lead times, arguing for obsolete stocks due to late market entrances, 
thus products with a higher level of fashion need to be produced in areas 
similar to where competitors produces theirs, in order to keep up with the 
existing market pace. Children’s clothing is a segment representing opposite 
requirements compared to ladies wear, as these products are extremely price 
sensitive. Therefore, children’s wear need to be produced where it is cheapest, 
i.e. in Asia, and if production were to be moved closer to the market, the 
products would be too expensive and the benefits with shorter lead times would 
not be materialized.  
 
Closing this chapter, we have learned that Lindex utilize a market responsive 
chain, in which the fashion intensity decides when, where and how each 
product segment should be produced, in order to fully capitalize their resources 
in the process of delivering their value proposition. 
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8 Conclusions 
 
The purpose with this concluding part is to sum up our main findings from the 
case studies and to link these to our theoretical frame of references. A 
reflection of applied theories will be conducted. Lastly, we will give 
recommendations for further research.  
 
8.1 Main findings 
8.1.1 Ge-kås 
Ge-kås’ value proposition were found to be based on offering a wide range of 
products from clothes to home electronics at the lowest possible price, targeting 
any person who is willing to pay higher than ordinary transportation and search 
costs. The value proposition is delivered by performing activities that fit 
together. Everything Ge-kås does has an extreme cost focus, as that is the only 
way to ensure sustainability in the low price business model. All sales and 
activities are performed at one location, allowing Ge-kås to have high cost 
efficiency in all logistical activities. The decision not to advertise or to have 
any discount campaigns not only eliminates advertising costs and coordination 
costs between logistics and advertising, but helps in smoothening out the 
customer flow, which importance should not be underestimated considering the 
tremendous number of customers Ge-kås attracts; recall that it is Sweden’s 
most visited tourist attraction. Furthermore, due to the decision not to advertise 
or to have any promise of specific assortment, customers will have no specific 
expectations regarding assortment and will thus have no reason to be 
dissatisfied about stockouts. 
 
When it comes to supply chain activities Ge-kås has a 100% retail focus, 
leaving everything else to suppliers; Ge-kås is not involved in design or 
production and do not have any purchasing offices, but instead lets suppliers 
come to Ge-kås and show their products. Besides these main themes, a number 
of complementary activities are performed that further reinforces Ge-kås value 
proposition, as was illustrated in figure 6. 
 
Recalling Porter’s (2003) arguments that tradeoffs are incompatibilities 
between strategic positions creating a need to choose, we believe Ge-kås has 
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managed to find a truly unique position that would be extremely difficult to 
copy, due to mutually reinforcing activities and strategic tradeoffs in choosing 
what not to do. Just as important as having a business model that is hard to 
copy is whether competitors want to copy it. We do not think this is the case 
either considering that when relying upon one location and word of moth 
marketing it would take very long time to reach a sales level that could generate 
large profits. Summarizing how Ge-kås delivers its value proposition, we 
believe the business model is sustainable and, with Porter’s words, that they 
definitely have chosen to run a different race. 
 
8.1.2 Ica 
Ica’s value proposition is based on the ability to satisfy customers’ needs for 
groceries. These needs vary substantially between individuals and between 
different occasions for the same individual. Ica meets customers through more 
than 1.760 stores and four different concepts, from vast Maxi Ica Stormarknad 
stores having 35.000 articles on 10.000 m2 to narrow and convenient Ica Nära 
stores with 4.000 articles on less than 500 m2. Ica supply all these store 
concepts with the same logistics system, enabling the whole constellation to 
benefit from high efficiency in DCs, full quantity discounts in purchasing, 
efficiency in JIT deliveries and low need for stores to carry inventory. 
 
In general, price levels on a competitive grocery market is a function of 
operating costs meaning that it is difficult, if not impossible, to outperform 
competitors in service output terms and at the same time having lower prices. 
Logistics related activities’ part of total operating costs has been found to be 
between 70-80%. Having this knowledge and applying fundamental laws of 
economies of scale, it is not surprising that convenient stores with high service 
output have much higher prices than larger store formats, even though it has 
been found that this effect to a small extent is neutralized at Ica, as all stores’ 
purchasing prices are they same, irrespective of smaller stores relatively higher 
resource consumption in DCs and transports. However, with a holistic view 
incorporating, for example, marketing activities and banking service for 
customers, high market coverage is most likely important, recalling that Ica 
Nära is by far the largest concept in numerical terms consisting of 1.061 stores. 
In this light the subsidizing might be strategically important. 
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Whether Ica has a unique position or not depends on how one defines 
uniqueness, and in what areas one consider. We believe that many grocery 
retailers have a similar supply chain like Ica has. The reason they have become 
so dominant is probably to be found somewhere else, perhaps in the decision to 
have stores operated by individual retailers as there own companies, thereby 
arguably bringing in a motivation that an employed store manager would not 
have; that is however outside this thesis’ scope. We believe Ica has made 
strategic trade offs when having the low cost chain Netto operated as a separate 
company as it probably would be difficult to efficiently combine a distribution 
system with DCs carrying 7-8.000 articles with a discount store concept’s 
much narrower assortment. Furthermore, by having it structured this way Ica 
also avoids inconsistencies in image, which would jeopardize the Ica brand. 
Focusing on supply chain activities only, we consider Ica to be practicing an 
optimizing competition running the same race faster than competitors. 
 
8.1.3 Lindex 
Lindex’ value proposition revealed that the company offers fashion clothing 
and lingerie for women in different phases in life, with such a great variety in 
sizes that all women should be able to satisfy their needs. Further, the 
complementary assortment offered for children is of a strategic nature as we 
believe most children’s clothing are being purchased by mothers, while these 
assortments might create brand awareness in low ages, thus creating customer 
loyalty in the end. Regarding the nature of demand of Lindex’ products, they 
are primarily innovative, thus arguing for a market responsive supply chain 
which purpose is to respond quickly to unpredictable demand in order to 
minimize stock outs, forced markdowns and obsolete inventory. 
 
Lindex’ approach in dealing with the challenges of time-based competition has 
been to develop a system aiming at increasing responsiveness by shortening the 
lead times. But, there is a limitation to this idea as our analysis argues Lindex’ 
products represent varying levels of fashion intensity, which suggest different 
product segments need different supply chains. For example, children’s wear 
has high price sensitivity and low fashion sensitivity, which mean Lindex need 
to live with longer lead times in order to find a balance between speed and cost. 
The same formula would be devastating if used for ladies wear, which are more 
fashion sensitive and less price-sensitive, thus Lindex tend to produce such 
items closer to the market in order to decrease lead times. Even though reduced 
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lead times generally mean higher distribution costs, it is motivated in this case 
as a faster response to consumer demand mean a more accurate forecast, higher 
sales and hence a decrease in market mediation costs.  
 
The above time to market scenario refers to the initial stage of a products life 
cycle, and Lindex’ attempts to meet demand during the life cycle is 
materializing through their fact based retail system. The end customer triggers 
the EDI system with purchases and a response is send to the DC, which 
replenish the stores continuously. The lead times are shortened by the QR 
system, increasing responsiveness by meeting demand quicker and more 
accurately while releasing inventory storing costs.  
 
The strategic position Lindex occupies is based upon their female focus, this 
trade off containing no offerings targeting males, should maximize their 
resource allocation towards the deliverance of their value proposition. If male 
items were to be introduced incompatibilities between products and service 
attributes would more likely appear as Lindex’ whole concept is directed 
towards females. For example, the stores would more likely have to be 
redesigned in order to attract males at all, which would lead to inconsistencies 
in image. Regarding the configuration of activities at Lindex, we believe the 
QR project is developed in a manner that should lead to mutually reinforcement 
between activities; thus the cost of performing one activity is lowered because 
of the manner in which other activities are performed. But, as this project was 
only recently established, it might be too early to say how successful this 
project is as the full materialization is yet to happen. When this occurs, Lindex’ 
strategic position needs to be compared to main competitors, which will reveal 
if the fit between activities are enough to enable sustainability.  
 
8.1.4 It all matters 
Even though we have not had the intention to compare our case companies with 
each other, as that has not been included in our research purpose, it would be 
interesting to illustrate how activities that companies perform are reflected in 
end customer prices. Such an attempt is performed in figure 24. Sizes of costs 
are not 100% precise, but that is not important here as the purpose is to 
exemplify how total costs are accumulated by all activities. 
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Figure 24: Division of the cost of activities 
(Ingemar Claesson Konsult, 2003, remodeled) 
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8.2 Reflections upon applied theories  
Having conducted this research project we can now reflect upon the theories 
used, starting with the general writings about SCM. In light of our own findings 
and experiences they appear a bit too utopian, or perhaps too theoretic; our 
findings give no support for a practitioner view of supply chains going from 
extraction of raw material to end customers. Second tier suppliers (i.e. 
suppliers’ suppliers) were the most remote actors we came across during 
interviews, which was the case when Lindex purchased textiles for some of 
their manufacturers. Our findings are thus in line with Stern et al’s (2001), that 
a perspective going from raw material to end customers is too comprehensive 
and that managers’ view is more arbitrary setting their own supply chain 
boarders. Bucklin’s theory for end-user preference has been very useful for our 
study, especially regarding Ica’s store concepts. The biggest contribution was 
the framework’s pedagogical qualities concerning logistic activities’ 
contribution to end customer prices. 
 
Fisher’s (1997) framework for the divisions of products when based upon their 
demand pattern into primarily functional or primarily innovative and supply 
chains into primarily physically efficient or primarily market responsive have 
also been found useful in our research. However, in our opinion the division of 
products and supply chains into two distinct categories feels too straight 
forward. When reading Fisher (1997) one gets the feeling that the groupings are 
almost mutually exclusive, but according to our findings it is definitely not a 
dichotomy. In the grocery sector this could be exemplified by the differences in 
supply chain activities between sensitive perishables and colonial assortment 
articles (like flour and sugar); furthermore Ica has also centralized low frequent 
articles to one central warehouse, which implies that the demand for different 
groceries varies a lot. In the clothing sector it could be exemplified by Lindex’ 
strategy for having garments produced in different parts of the world as well as 
the opportunities of choosing freight alternatives depending upon garments’ 
fashion content. We believe that Fisher’s (1997) uncertainty framework is 
better described as a supply chain continuum, on which there are functional 
products and efficient supply chains on one end and innovative products and 
responsive supply chains on the opposite. Between are products and supply 
chains with varying differences in demand versus efficiency and 
responsiveness. 
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The separation of supply chain competition into cost-based versus time-based 
competition feels logical from a theoretical perspective, but also in light of our 
findings. Even though we found many examples of typical cost-based activities 
in the Ge-kås and Ica cases (distribution efficiency, JIT, economies of scale 
thinking, etc) and time-based activities in the Lindex case (QR, air-freights, etc) 
we consider it also here to be better described as a continuum, as the boarders 
between the different ways of competing are not sharp. 
 
8.3 Recommendations for further research 
This study has had a quite broad and explorative approach, investigating very 
different value propositions and business strategies. It would be interesting to 
conduct a more detailed study, focusing on one case company. Such a study 
could include detailed product life cycles and product flow analyses, in which 
figure 16 could be used to find ways of reducing non-value adding time. An 
activity based costing study would illustrate where costs occur and also how 
much the costs of performing activities is reflected in end customers prices. 
 
Another interesting area to examine would be what kind of management 
accounting that is used in SCM. One performance measure could probably be 
cash to cash cycles (i.e. the time it takes to convert expenditures at raw material 
or supplier level to incomes from sales to consumers). The development within 
the IT area has enabled companies to increase their control over product flows 
and inventories, arguably allowing reductions in safety stocks. Most likely, 
these developments have had impacts on companies’ cash flows. A cash flow 
analysis with a SCM perspective would be very interesting.  
 
All case companies included in this study were retailers. Another angle when 
studying SCM could be to include different actors in a supply chain, for 
example one retailer and one or two of that retailer’s suppliers. Such a study 
would perhaps benefit from having a relationship focus, examining the value of 
trust, information sharing, and possible occurrences of open book accounting in 
supply chain relationships. 
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